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INTRODUCTION
"For low-skilled workers in much of the world, U.S. admission
policies make illegal immigration the most viable means of entering the
country."' Low average schooling, which disqualifies many potential
*
Editor-in-Chief, UCLA Law Review, Volume 58. J.D. candidate, UCLA School
of Law, 2011; A.B., Brown University, 2006. Heartfelt thanks to Professor Hiroshi Motomura for his thoughtful edits and dedicated teaching. Thanks also to Julia Vizquez for
encouraging me to pursue this topic, to the editors of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law
for their editorial expertise, and to Clifton Meals and my parents for their love and support.
1.
GORDON H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN PELATIONS, THE ECONOMIC LoGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 14 (2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/
12969/economicilogic of illegaLimmigration.html.
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immigrants from employment-based visas, and long queues affecting
family preference immigration from high-traffic countries, make the admission criteria outlined in the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) prohibitive for most would-be immigrants to the United States.2
Perhaps due to this failure of immediate legal avenues, many immigrants
enter the country illegally. Though many eventually gain legal status, in
the meantime they live and work in the United States without documentation.3 "Illegal immigration thus accomplishes what legal immigration
does not: It moves large numbers of low-skilled4 workers from a lowproductivity to a high-productivity environment.*
Recognizing that job opportunities are a significant motivating factor in the decision to come to the United States, President Reagan signed
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, the "centerpiece"' of which was the country's first comprehensive federal employer
sanctions law.6 "Conditioning U.S. jobs on proof of [work] authorization,
so the logic went, would deter immigrants from coming to the United
States for work reasons, encourage those that were here without meaningful job opportunities to return home, and over the long term reduce
the rate of unauthorized migration.' 7 The Senate report for a version of
the bill that became IRCA suggested that, while Third World development, closing the gap in wage disparity and working conditions, and the
achievement of higher standards of living in sending countries were longterm goals that would help curb illegal immigration, the short-term cure
was to eliminate the availability of the jobs that serve as a magnet. 8 Prohibiting the hiring of unauthorized workers would be the most
immediate way to cause meaningful change in the amount of unlawful
migration to the United States.
More than twenty years later, IRCA's employer sanctions continue
to influence discussions on comprehensive immigration reform, despite
2. Id.at 14-15.
3. See id. (citing Pew Hispanic Center estimates that in 2005 80-85 percent of
Mexican immigrants who had been in the United States for under ten years were unauthorized.
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(2005), available at http://

pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdo.
at 15.
4. Id.
5. Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcetnent of hnnigration Laws, 96 GEO.L.J. 777, 787
(2008).

6. Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of WhiteCollar Crine, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1041, 1042 (1990). While this was the first comprehensive attempt at the federal level, some states had employer sanctions laws before
IRCA. California's, for example, was the subject of a preemption lawsuit discussed itfra
Part lI.B.
Stephen Lee, Private hntnigration Screening inthe Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV.
7.
1103, 1113 (2009).
8. See S. REP. No. 98-62, at 7-8 (1983).
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overwhelming evidence that sanctions do not significantly reduce the
number of unauthorized migrants in the workforce.9 Proponents of employer sanctions still view employer verification mechanisms as one of the
most promising solutions to immigration enforcement because they are
less dangerous than armed border enforcement and less expensive than
detention and removal from the interior. In addition, given that no government agency charged with enforcing immigration law could, on its
own, patrol the more than 7.5 million businesses across the nation to find
and remove unauthorized workers, enlisting employers is a useful force
multiplier." For those whose response to the failure of sanctions is to increase both the likelihood and the severity of employer sanctions, 2 the
hope is that ramping up enforcement will lead to a closing of the employment loophole, as IRCA originally intended. 3
While employer sanctions are an understandable first reaction to the
job-magnet effect and an inexpensive means of multiplying the available
9.
See NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, TALKING POINTS (2007), available at http://
nclr.forumone.com/files/44530_fileEEVS-TalkingPoints.pdf;
see also Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 9, 2006 ("The sponsor of the
House legislation, Representative James Sensenbrenner, a Republican from Wisconsin,
says bluntly that illegals are bad for the U.S. economy. His bill would require employers
to veriFy the status of their workers from a national database and levy significant penalties
on violators.").
10.
See Comprehensive Immigration Reform in 2009: Can We Do It and How?: Hearing
Before the S. Judiciary Subcomnn. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security, 111th Cong.
(2009) [hereinafter Meissner Testimony] (testimony by Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow,
Migration Policy Institute); see also Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order
Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REv. 809, 847 (2007) (asserting that unauthorized
immigration allows for a population of low-skilled workers to enter the country and
eventually gain legal status if they are not removed by ex-post, internal verification inechanisms that provide an opportunity for the government to gather more in-depth
information than ex-ante border verification mechanisms might).
11.
See Meissner Testimony, supra note 10.
12.
Rep. Sensenbrenner said in 2006 that we need to "cut off the magnet ofjobs
for illegal immigrants. That means having realistic and enforceable employer sanctions. So
hiring illegals because there is no enforcement ends up lowering the labor costs of the
people who hire them, so much so that with low fines and very selective and spotty enforcement, people can get away with undercutting the competition that is only hiring
citizens and legal inmiigrants with green cards ....
[I]f we shut off the jobs by enforcing
employer sanctions, many of the illegal inmigrants will simply decide to go home because
they cannot make money in the United States. And you will see an attrition." Danielle
Knight, Immigration Debate: Q&A with Rep. James SensenbrennerJr., U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 6, 2006, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/
060606/6iimnigrationa.htm.
13.
See Pham, supra note 5, at 805 ("The biggest enforcement problem for employer sanctions is simply that they are rarely enforced."); see also Jeffrey Manns, Private
Monitoring of Gatekeepers: Tie Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 887,
944 (suggesting that private monitoring of employers will "breathe new life into the gatekeeping duties of employers by providing them with credible threats that their
compliance measures will be subject to ongoing oversight").
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enforcers of immigration law,14 they have proven unworkable for employers as a result of the shortcomings of the existing verification mechanisms
(vulnerability to document and identity fraud has proven inevitable with
both the 1-9 system and E-Verify) s and have led to rampant violations of
both civil rights laws and IRCA itself. 16
In response to employer sanctions' widely recognized failure and the
growing number of unlawful migrants, the federal government has considered additional means of decentralizing (and thus expanding) immigraimnigration enforcement. President George W Bush made a concerted
effort to involve local authorities in immigration law enforcement. With
encouragement from former Attorney General John Ashcroft,' 7 and perhaps as backlash to 9/11 or the flagging economy, 8 some states and
municipalities responded to rising anti-inumigrant sentiment by passing
local measures intended to augment enforcement of federal immigration
law.'9
While local and state attempts at direct immigration enforcement
are likely expressly or impliedly preempted by IRCA, INA § 287(g) offers
another avenue for delegation of immigration authority. A result of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
of 1996,2° INA § 287(g) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security
14.
15.

Lee, supra note 7, at 1105-06.
See U.S.

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION: CHAL-

LENGES EXIST IN IMPLEMENTING A MANDATORY ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION SYSTEM

[hereinafter

GAO,

CHALLENGES

EXIST],

available

at

(2007)

http://www.gao.gov/new.

items/d07924t.pdf. For a longer discussion of both verification systems, see infra Part l.B.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANC16.
TIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION (1990) [hereinafter GAO, QUESTION OF
DISCRIMINATION], available at http://archive.gao.gov/d24t8/140974.pdf.
Nchimunya D. Ndulo, Note, State Employer Sanctions Laws and the Federal
17.
Preemption Doctrine: The Legal Arizona Workers Act Revisited, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 849, 851 (2009) ("Then-United States Attorney General John Ashcroft and other
Department ofJustice officials encouraged local governments to enforce immigration laws
as part of their anti-terrorism mission. Additionally, following the events of September
11th, Congress drafted legislation such as the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien
Removal Act (CLEAR Act), which would have financially rewarded local governments
willing to enforce immigration laws. Although the CLEAR Act did not pass, some of its
core provisions continue to resurface in legislation pending in Congress.").
18.
Border policies and interior enforcement--seen as an extension of border
laws--serve to reinforce physical borders, preserve resources for those with lawful status,
and send a symbolic message about U.S. immigration policy, whether or not such mecha-

hen
nisms are actually effective or consistently implemented. See Huyen Pham,
Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1115 (2009). In the current economic
climate, resources are ever more jealously guarded, and the push to reserve benefits, especially employment opportunities, for those who are lawfully present has increasing
political appeal. Id. at 1147.
See infra Part 1Ifor examples of attempts at local immigration enforcement.
19.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 10420.
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified across various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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to enter into Memoranda of Agreement with state and local law enforcement agencies, permitting designated officers to perform immigration law
enforcement functions as long as they receive proper training and supervision by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers.-1
Without such training and limited, delegated authority, local officers

could not identify, process, or detain unlawful migrants because that
22 kind
of direct immigration enforcement is an exclusively federal power. Thus,
2

87(g) has been used as a means of expanding federal immigration enforcement power by way of limited agreements with states and localities.

Like subfederal enforcement and

2

87(g) agreements, IRCA's em-

ployer sanctions scheme results in a delegation and decentralization of
immigration authority meant to increase the number of available immigration enforcers. Employers, however, more than other subfederal
enforcement agents,23 face great difficulty in complying with anything
24
beyond the letter of the law. Without any training to speak of, employers are expected to verify the authenticity of any one of twenty-seven
identity and work eligibility documents." With so many fraudulent
Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and NaIMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/
factsheets/070622factsheet 287gprogover.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
22.
See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983). Preemption of
state and local authority was the norm until the Office of Legal Counsel caused major
confusion in the immigration enforcement debate in 2002 when it drafted an opinion
asserting the "inherent power" states (as sovereign entities) have to enforce federal inmfigration law. Compare Memorandum From Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Off.
of Legal Counsel (Apr. 3, 2002) with Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, Teresa Wynn Rosenburgh, Off. of Legal Counsel, Memorandum
Opinion for the U.S. Attorney S. District of Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996), available at http://
www.justice.gov/olc/immstopola.htrm. Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this
Note, but see supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text for further discussion.
23.
This Note takes as given that employers are actually inmmfigration screeners and
part of the enforcement of immigration law. This premise, however, has been the subject
of some debate because employers do not detain or deport people. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown notes that employer sanctions encourage employers to screen aliens for
work permits and penalize employers who fail to do so. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown,
Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (2009). MichaelJ. Wishnie
also contends that employers are private enforcers, see Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 215, as do others,
including Stephen Lee, see Lee, supra note 7, at 1110-19, and Huyen Pham, see Pham,
supra note 5, at 784-85, though Pham debates whether employer screening is truly enforcement or just execution of government policy. Congressional hearings before the
passage of IRCA suggested that employers did not even have to make judgments conceming the authenticity of the documentation, an interpretation that is reinforced by the
good faith clause and the fact that the document need only "reasonably appear on its face
to be genuine." See Calavita, supra note 6, at 1058.
24.
Calavita, supra note 6, at 1059 ("Compliance with the paperwork requirement
had come to stand in for compliance with the real heart of the employer sanctions lawthe 'knowing hire' provision.").
21.

tionality Act, U.S.

25.

GAO,

CHALLENGES EXIST,

supra note 15, at 6.
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documents available, employers must use their considerable discretion to
separate valid documents from fraudulent documents. In addition, employers must wade through the complexity of the INA to determine
whether the documents presented, if valid, prove work authorization. For
example, some people are in the United States legally but are not workauthorized, such as certain student visa holders; others have recently
adjusted status or are in the process of adjustment, both of which affect
employment authorization in subtle ways that employers may not recognize or understand without training. Thus, even in seemingly
straightforward situations, "in the absence of a counterfeit-proof identification card, 'employers would have to use their discretion in determining
[worker] eligibility.' ,,2
Because of the vast expansion of discretionary immigration authority through delegation to private employers untrained as inimigration
screeners, there is great potential for employer mistake and abuse, such
that federal employer sanctions, especially if increased, raise issues similar
to preempted subfederal enforcement. Local immigration enforcement
has been preempted because of fear that a lack of uniformity in the application of federal immigration law would result in the creation of "a
thousand borders' 2 7 and could lead to increased discrimination. 2' The use
of more than 7.5 million private employers as immigration screeners
should be questionable by the same logic. Though employer sanctions are
not preempted by federal law (because, like 2 8 7 (g) agreements, they explicitly form part of the federal immigration scheme in the INA),
employers' inconsistent and unreliable determinations of immigration status, due to rampant fraudulent documents, lack of training, and complex
immigration regulations, lead to the same problematic results of decentralized, subfederal enforcement.
This Note explores the ways in which the failings of the current
system of employer sanctions should render employer sanctions invalid for
the same reasons that underlie preemption of state and local immigration
enforcement laws. Because sanctions are intended to have a direct impact
on inmiigration and require individual, private employers to enforce immigration law (without training!) as screeners of employees' eligibility and
immigration status, IPCA's employer sanctions scheme results in an uneven and inconsistent application of what is meant to be a comprehensive
federal scheme of immigration law.29 Moreover, if proposals to ramp up
employer sanctions are successful, the potential for workplace discrinination will increase because employers, having access to only inadequate

26.
Calavita, supra note 6, at 1057-58.
27.
Phani, supra note 18, at 995.
See discussion Part IIl.B.1 infra.
28.
29.
See Hofinan Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)
(calling IRCA a comprehensive scheme).
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means of verifying work authorization, will face dueling liabilities under
antidiscrimination and immigration law.
Part I explores the use of employers as immigration enforcers in the
context of currently available-and inadequate-mechanisms used to verify employment eligibility. Part II outlines the values underlying federal
preemption of local immigration enforcement and the limited exception
allowed under a 2 87(g) agreement. Part III then makes explicit the parallel
failings of subfederal and private-employer enforcement, such as lack of
uniformity in the application of federal immigration law and potential
increases in discrimination.
The Note suggests that while the perceived need to broaden federal
enforcement through delegation of power indicates a need for comprehensive immigration reform, calls to heighten employer sanctions are
misplaced because federal employer sanctions suffer from the same problems underlying preemption of subfederal immigration enforcement.
Ultimately, however, the Note concludes that, despite their failings and
despite the problems paralleled in subfederal enforcement contexts, employer sanctions will likely remain in force because the federal
government is unable to exclusively manage immigration enforcement
and cannot afford the loss of what is ultimately
a largely symbolic state30
ment in opposition to unlawful migration.
I. IRCA's

EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: FROM PUNISHMENT TO
DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER

While IRCA's employer sanctions are not preempted by federal law
(they are federal law), their implementation, especially under a regime of
heightened enforcement as called for repeatedly in Congress, raises identical normative issues underlying subfederal immigration enforcement. This
section discusses IRCA's employer sanctions and demonstrates that they
have failed in their stated goals: rather than forming a program that punishes errant employers, the "sanctions" have become a delegation of
federal immigration enforcement authority to private employers.
A. A Brief History of IRCA's Employer Sanctions
In 1986, § 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) made
it illegal for employers to "hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee ... [or] to
continue to employ" unauthorized workers "knowing" that those workers
30.
A key goal of IRCA's drafters was sending a message that employment of unauthorized workers would no longer be tolerated, "regardless of whether it was financially,
technically or politically possible to enforce [employer sanctions] rigorously in the short
run." MICHAEL Fix & PAUL T. HILL, ENFORCING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: CHALLENGES
AND STRATEGIES 39 (1990).
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were unauthorized.3' Previous immigration legislation, such as the
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which made it illegal to "harbor, transport,
or conceal illegal entrants," included an amendment, called the Texas Pro31
viso, that expressly excluded employment from the "harboring" category.
Under the Proviso, "[w]hether or not 'knowing' employment of undocumented workers would constitute
harboring remained ambiguous despite
3

congressional dicsin
discussion.

Noehees
a interpreted
ntrrtdb
h
Nonetheless, th33vs
the Proviso was
by the

INS [and employers] as carte blanche to employ undocumented workers."34 Thus, while not the first piece of federal immigration legislation

regarding employment, IRCA's employer sanctions provision effectively
ended the "long-standing laissez-faire policy

'3

toward the employment of

undocumented workers. Or so it seemed.
While cracking down on illegal employment--so as to deter
unlawful migration-was the underlying purpose of IRCA's employer
sanctions, 36 critics claim that, in implementation, IRCA's sanctions did
little to change the landscape. "A historical analysis of U.S. immigration
laws since the late nineteenth century reveals that these laws were often
hapless attempts to resolve conflicts derived from a fundamental
contradiction between the economic utility of immigrants versus political
demands to restrict this source of cheap labor., 37 From their inception,
IRCA's employer sanctions were no different. Though the language and
legislative history of employer sanctions suggest that they were intended
to have a true deterrent effect on unlawful hiring, their implementation
indicates that the sanctions were not meant to pose a real threat to
employers.38 INS guidelines "stressed cooperation" over "harassment and
31.
32.

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2006).
Kitty Calavita, The Inmigration Policy Debate: Critical Analysis and Future Options,

inz MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: ORIGINS,

CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY

OPTIONS 151, 159 ( W. Cornelius &J. Bustamante eds., 1989).
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Calavita, supra note 6, at 1042.
36.
Former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff reiterated this underlying explanation for an employer sanctions regime in August 2007: "We all know that a
critical part of immigration enforcement is effective interior and worksite enforcement.
The reason for that is because the magnet that brings most economic migrants into this
country is work. And if we have worksite enforcement directed at illegal employment,
we strike at that magnet." Dep't of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff &
Dep't of Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, Remarks at a Press Conference on Border Security and Administrative Immigration Reforms (Aug. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_11 86781502047.shtm.
37.
Calavita, supra note 6, at 1045.
38.
See id. at 1065 (asserting that the "lawmaking process itself ... ensured that
employer violations would entail very little risk"); Lee, supra note 7, at 1126-27
("IRCA's design and history suggests (sic) that Congress intended to deter unauthorized
inmmigration by targeting employers. IRCA's implementation history, however, demonstrates that from the very beginning the then-INS demonstrated a willingness to work
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heavy-handed enforcement. '39 IRCA's good faith compliance 40 standard
merely requires that employers check the document to see if it
reasonably appears on its face to be genuine ' 41 and relates to the person
presenting it. This standard, coupled with the three days' warning given to
employers before their records are investigated, makes prosecuting
employers for "knowing[ly]" hiring unauthorized workers very difficult
and results in compliance with only the letter of the law. 2 "[W]hile it is
true that IRCA formally prohibits employers from hiring unauthorized
immigrants under threat of civil and criminal sanction, it has been so
infrequently enforced that employers can escape detection in all but the
most egregious circumstances. ' 43 Indeed, when Kitty Calavita asked
upper-level INS officials how leniently they would interpret "appears on
its face to be genuine," one official said "the employer should be
suspicious if there is 'five tons of white-out' on a worker's document ...
[or] if the identification showed the photo of a gorilla."" These lax
standards led David Martin to call the document verification process
"empty ceremony.""
In the more than twenty years since their implementation, sanctions
have proven to be a largely empty threat due to the ease of basic administrative compliance and the difficulty INS/ICE has in proving "knowing"
hiring in all but the most egregious cases. In the years following 9/11,
employer sanctions have become even less likely due to INS/ICE's low
prioritization of workplace enforcement, with far more resources dedicated to criminal aliens and threats to national security. 46 Between fiscal years
with employers, rather than fully conmitting to a policy of targeting and punishing them
.... Many features of the then-INS's enforcement policy were designed to send the
message that employers would not be sanctioned as a part of its regulatory strategy.").
39.
Lee, supra note 7, at 1127 (citing Jason Juffras, IRCA and the Enforcement Mission
of the Imnligration and Naturalization Service, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS'
IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM

33, 40 (Michael Fix ed., 1991)).

40.
INA § 274A(b)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
41.
INA § 274A(b)(t)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
42.
Calavita, supra note 6, at 1059 (suggesting that "compliance with the paperwork
requirement had come to stand in for compliance with the real heart of the employer
sanctions law-the 'knowing hire' provision").
43.
Lee, supra note 7, at 1106.
44.
Calavita, supra note 6, at 1063.
45.
David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Inigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 525, 546 (2007). But see Cox & Posner, supra note 10 (discussing the
first-order, ex ante port-of-entry exclusion mechanisms versus the second-order, ex post
internal deportation systems and suggesting that internal verification mechanisms are not
necessarily mere symbolism because the government might prefer ex post screening since
it provides an opportunity to gather more in-depth information).
46.
Agency priorities have shifted over time, with the INS focusing resources on
criminal aliens in the 1990s through today and a shift toward "counter-terrorism" efforts
following September 11, 2001. See Wishnie, supra note 23, at 209-10; see also GOV'T AcCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:

WEAKNESSES

HINDER EMPLOYMENT
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1999 and 2003, the percentage of ICE agents' time designated to worksite
enforcement dropped from approximately 9 percent (the equivalent of
240 full-time employees) to approximately 4 percent (ninety full-time
equivalents).47 The number of employer sanctions fines issued by INS and
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)45 similarly declined in the
same period, from 417 notices of intent to fine in 1999 to 105 by 2001
and to just three by 2004.' 9 Though sanctions actions increased briefly in
2007,50 even when sanctions were applied, they were often negotiated

VERIFICATION

AND WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

EFFORTS

14 (2006) [hereinafter GAO,

HINDER] (noting that between 1999 and 2003, worksite enforcement efforts
generally decreased from about 9 percent to 4 percent of employee rime in favor of"critical infrastructure protection because the fact that unauthorized workers can obtain
employment at critical infrastructure sites indicates that there are vulnerabilities in those
sites' hiring and screening practices, and unauthorized workers employed at those sites are
vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, and other criminals").
"Since removing criminal aliens wins the INS praise, while sanctions enforcement brings
attacks from employers, worker groups, and politicians, removing criminal aliens has become the INS's highest priority." Lee, supra note 7, at 1128 n.86 (quoting Philip Martin
& Mark Miller, Employer Sanctions: French, German, and U.S. Experiences, INT'L MIGRATION
PAPERS (ILO/Int'l Migration Branch, Geneva, Switz.), Sept. 2000, at 2).
47.
GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER, supra note 46, at 14.
In 2003, the INS was replaced with two agencies-U.S. Citizenship and Immi48.
gration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Inuigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which
handle all investigative and enforcement functions-consolidated under the newly created
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Lee, supra note 7, at 1119. During the same period, apprehensions at the
49.
worksite were similarly down, from 2,849 in 1999 to 685 in 2004. 2001 INS STAT. Y.B.
tbl.61; Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm. This decline
in enforcement may be explained by Karl Manheim's suggestion that "[e]ven when the
law plainly prohibits [unlawful immigrants'] employment, enforcement is often lax because of powerful forces within the economy which benefit from their presence in the
labor market 'as a source of cheap labor.' In other words, lax enforcement of immigration
laws may be a conscious decision by the federal government, rather than the result of
neglect or incompetence." Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy,
22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 1002 (1995).
From 2005 to 2007, worksite apprehensions increased from 1,116 to 4,077. Fact
50.
Shieet: Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 30,
2009), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm. Though the number
of apprehensions of unauthorized workers increased in this period, it still represents only a
tiny fraction of the millions of undocumented workers. ICE, the federal agency responsible for investigating illegal hirings, increased enforcement of the employer sanctions law
in 2007, leading to a dozen major busts. ICE officials focused on criminal claims against
company officials, rather than just civil penalties, which some employers had come to see
as the cost of doing business. A first civil offense, for example, resulted in fines of $275 to
$2,200 for each unauthorized employee. Criminal penalties, on the other hand, soared as
high as $3,000 and up to six months in prison for each illegal hiring. See Jacques Billeaud,
Legislatures Look at Employer Sanctions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Legislatures+look+at+employer+sanctiors-aO6ll1308259.
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down to a level low enough to be justified as an acceptable business ex51
pense.
Available evidence indicates that the employer sanctions program52
has not succeeded in one of the main goals of private enforcement:
weakening the 'pull' factor of unlawful migration. 3 Rather than decrease,
the numbers have increased dramatically since IRCA's passage."s "For
much of the past decade, more than 1 million immigrants have entered
the United States legally, and about another half a million have settled
illegally."55 In March 2005, after almost twenty years of employer sanctions, there were over 7.2 million unauthorized workers in the civilian
workforce (about 5 percent of the total workforce and much larger percentages in certain industries). 56 By March 2008, the estimate had grown
to over 8.3 million undocumented workers in the United States labor
force. 57 At the same time, however, government Census data and estimates
from the Pew Hispanic Center indicated that, for the first time since
2005, the number of undocumented immigrants had either declined
slightly or, at the very least, grown more slowly from 2005 to 2008 than
it had in the previous decade. 8 Those in favor of tough immigration
laws attribute the slowing growth of the undocumented population to
51.
See Pham, supra note 5, at 815 ("Because of the costs required to defend the
fines in administrative proceedings, INS (and now ICE) often negotiate with employers
to substantially lower the amounts of these fines .... The substantially lower amount of
fines ordered and collected led some ICE officials to complain that the fines do not provide any meaningful deterrent."); Calavita, supra note 6, at 1054 ("[G]iven the size of
potential fines, violations were an acceptable risk. According to the general manager of a
restaurant, 'the fines are a reprimand, not a serious threat.' "). Though Calavita wrote
almost twenty years ago, the fact that the likelihood of employer sanctions has been on
the dechne, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text, suggests that what was never
considered a serious threat has become even less so.

52.
For a discussion of the goals of private enforcement, see Pham, supra note 5, at
800-01.
53.
Though this "failure" of employer sanctions is not the focus of this Note, it is
worth mentioning. Some have suggested that these numbers are misleading because there
is no way to know if illegal immigration might have increased more or at a more rapid
rate in the absence of employer sanctions. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Employer Sanctions:
Past and Future, in THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED
(Peter Duignan & L.H. Gann eds., 1998).

STATES OVER IMMIGRATION

171, 177-78

54.
See, e.g., Ceceha M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 347-48 (1994); Maria Isabel
Medina, The Criminalizationof Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5
GEO. MASON L. REV.

669, 688-95 (1997).

55.

Meissner Testimony, supra note 10.

56.

ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

PLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS

57.

RL 33973,
1-2 (2007).

UNAUTHORIZED EM-

JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UN-

AUTHORIZED

IMMIGRANTS

IN THE

UNITED

pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf.
58.
Pham, supra note 18, at 1126-27.

STATES,

at iii

(2009),

available at http://
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increased enforcement under the Bush Administration, while others argue
that the nation's flagging economy and widespread unemployment are
behind the decline. 9 A middle ground perspective suggests that increased
popuinterior enforcement may result in the diversion of undocumented
6
0
lations to other regions, rather than affecting return migration.
Despite the slight decline in numbers, there is no question that unlawful migration has continued since the passage of employer sanctions.
As of January 2009, there were an estimated eleven million unauthorized
immigrants living in the United States. 6' This contemporary data may
have been foreshadowed by Kitty Calavita's 1990 study (four years after
IRCA's passage), which found that, in industries that had traditionally
been immigrant-dependent, nearly half of hiring managers interviewed at
southern California companies suspected that they had hired unauthorized workers, and more than 10 percent admitted to knowingly hiring
undocumented employees.62 More importantly, several employers indicated that they had no intention of abandoning the practice of unlawful
hiring because competition required it, and because the usually empty
threat •of63sanctions constituted merely an additional, acceptable cost of
business.
Under IRCA's employer sanctions scheme, then, employers who
hire outside the law gain a competitive advantage over those who follow
the law.64 Ironically, instead of punishing or sanctioning employers, IRCA
has proven effective as "de facto immunity ...to negotiate low wages,
59.
Id. at 1127 (pointing to the Center for Immigration Studies as the
pro-enforcement example and the Inmigration Policy Center as a group in favor of liberalizing immigration laws).
60.
Id. at 1129 (citing the Migration Policy Institute's theory of the cause of
decreasing numbers of immigrants).
See Teresa Watanabe, Illegal Immigrant Population in U.S. Plummets, According to a
61.
New Report, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/02/
the-number-of-illegal-inimigrants-living-in-the-us-plummeted-to-10-million-in-2009from-116-million-the-previous-year-ma.html (citing a DHS report documenting a decline from 11.6 million unauthorized immigrants in January 2008 to 10.8 million in
January 2009).
62.
Calavita, supra note 6, at 1050-51.
Id. at 1053-55.
63.
64.
See id. at 1054 (quoting a garment shop owner as feeling competitive pressure
to violate immigration law with respect to the hiring of unauthorized workers: "When
you have someone who's bidding against you and using illegals and paying them under
the table, it's not really right." Another employer indicated plainly that "there's a lot of
pressure right here not to comply." Indeed, 57 percent of the employers Calavita

interviewed thought that their competitors used undocumented workers.). Employers
have also expressed concern that participating in programs like E-Verify could place them
at a competitive disadvantage compared to nonparticipating competitors in a tight labor
market. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

GAO/GDD-99-33,

ILLEGAL ALIENS:

2
(1999) [hereinafter GAO, SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES], available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1999/gg99033.pdf
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disregard workplace protections, and otherwise suppress worker dissent[,]
...maximizing profit over the interests of advancing the goals of our nation's immigration and labor and employment laws.
Though initially conceptualized as a means of threatening liability to
employers who hire unauthorized workers, employer sanctions have ultimately served largely as a force multiplier to enhance (at least the illusion
of) interior immigration law enforcement against undocumented employees.66 The very need to expand federal forces through the use of
employers suggests that employer liability is an empty threat because DHS
lacks sufficient personnel/resources to truly follow through to any great
degree on employer sanctions.6 ' The following section outlines this shift
from employers as targets to employers as delegates of federal immigration
authority.

65.
Lee, supra note 7, at 1107. Another goal of employer sanctions is presumably to
punish those who benefit from unlawful hiring and to create incentives to enter legally
since unlawful entry will not result in employment opportunities. Indeed, employees rather
than employers have become the focus of the employer sanctions system. Of course, some
would argue that those who gain livelihood to which they are not legally entitled should
face some punishment, especially when others who go through legal channels are not able
to find legitimate employment opportunities. While employees unlawfully seeking work
are also skirting irmmigration law, the focus almost exclusively on employees rather than
employers has had the unfortunate effect of undermining workers' rights more broadly
because employers, not fearing liability for themselves, use the threat of DHS reporting to
subdue employee complaints about workplace conditions. Id.
66.
Some sort of force multiplier is required because the cost of identifying all those
who might contribute to American workplaces and eventually become citizens "render[s]
impractical any policy that relies only on Congress, [federal] agencies, and other public
entities." Id. at 1115.
67.
DHS employs 31,500 immigration officials (split between ICE and USCIS),
compared to millions of employers nationwide, including over 1.1 million in construction
and manufacturing/production alone. Id. at 1105-06. Tellingly, in Calavita's 1990 study
of employers' responses to IRCA sanctions, 32 percent of employers were "convinced
that the INS [did] not have the ability to enforce the law. A number of employers cited
the lack of INS resources, reasoning, as one restaurant manager did, 'It's going to be a
nightmare for them [the INS]. I suspect that they will probably spotcheck .... There are
just too many companies that use undocumented workers.' " Calavita, supra note 6, at
1053. However, the limited availability of DHS employees does not have to doom federal
enforcement. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, has similarly limited
enforcement capabilities but has still been successful in securing high levels of voluntary
compliance with tax laws. See Andrew Parker, Collecting 1hat America Owes, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 27, 2005, at 12 (quoting Mark Everson, head of the IRS: "What we cannot afford is to let our tax laws be viewed in the same way as our inmnigration or drug
laws are, where too large a segment of the populace says: 'Those laws are not what we
respect.' ").
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B. Employers as Private Immigration Screeners
In 1986, IRCA's implementation of employer sanctions "expanded
the private sector's role in enforcement. Since then, the federal government has required employers to verify identity and work authorization,
but ,,68
they can choose to comply with varying diligence and punctiliousness. IRCA's employer sanctions scheme both empowers and requires
employers to become private immigration screeners,6 even de facto
agents of the INS (now part of the DHS)5 "expected to judge whether
the documents presented [as proof of work authorization] are obviously
counterfeit or fraudulent.' 71 IRCA requires employers to screen workers
and verify their immigration status. "Thus, along with port-of-entry inspectors, international carriers, asylum officers, and an increasing number
of state and local law enforcement officers, employers assist DHS in a
screening capacity by identifying those immigrants who, in their judgment, ought to be reported to DHS officials for removal.! 72 Employers,
then, rather than being the target of sanctions, become "agents of the
State," allowing DHS to work with (instead of against) employers to examine documents, consult federal databases, and otherwise verify
prospective employees' innigration statuses."
While other interior enforcement involves more direct authority to
exclude on the basis of immigration status (such as 287(g) agreements and
federal enforcement that does not take place at the border), private employers are expected to review immigration-related documents, use their
discretion in making determinations about the authenticity of those documents and the applicant's work authorization, and then dole out essential

68.
Hiroshi Motonmura, Immigration Outside tie Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037,
2069 (2008).
69.
See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 23, at 215 ("IRCA has made private employers
the instrument of immigration enforcement."). Stephen Lee outlines in detail how
IRCA's employer sanctions lead to the use of employers as inmigration screeners, just as
in airline sanction laws, where "Congress has imposed a set of obligations onto a private
entity, which is charged with the duty of carrying out a service traditionally carried out by
a public entity." Lee, supra note 7, at 1114 n.32. This delegation of screening responsibilities "provides a cost-effective way to winnow down the universe of potential immigrants
to a manageable size" considering that DHS itself only employs approximately 31,500
immigration screeners, compared to the millions of employers whose services could be
added to the forces. Id. at 1116.
70.
Ren&e Suarez Congdon, Note, Comparing Employer Sanctions Provisions and Employmet Eligibility Verification Procedures in theUnited States and the United Kingdom, 18 IND.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 391, 402 (2008).
71.

GAO, SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES, supra note 64, at 4.

72.
73.

Lee, supra note 7, at 1105.
Id. at 1108.
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benefits on the basis of that decision. 4 Using their delegated, discretionary
authority, employers "shape the conditions under which unauthorized
inm-nigrants remain in the United States and define the conditions triggering DHS detention and removal."7' Though interior enforcement
designed to deny benefits on the basis of unlawful immigration status
does not deny physical access to the country and does not necessarily result in deportation, exclusion from essential benefits, such as employment,
is effectively as exclusionary as physical denial of entry at the border. v
Indeed, Huyen Pham has called employer enforcement
the "most signifi7
cant" private enforcement of immigration law.
Employers perform their role as immigration screeners through
compliance with required employer work status verification systems such
as the 1-9 process and use of the federal electronic database, E-Verify. To
provide meaningful compliance, employers must pay detailed attention to
a complex variety of immigration status or work authorization
documents. As a result, work-status verification cannot be seen as selfenforcing but rather requires significant employer discretion in its
application. 8 Unfortunately for employers (and those hoping that
74.
See Pham, supra note 18, at 1123-24 (discussing the distinction between direct
ininigration enforcement and what she calls "moving borders" interior enforcement, of
which employer sanctions are an example).
75.
Lee, supra note 7, at 1109. See also Cox & Posner, supra note 10 at 847 (suggesting that ex-post, internal verification mechanisms provide an opportunity for the
government to gather more in-depth information than ex-ante border verification mechanisms might).
76.
Phami, supra note 18, at 1120. Pham acknowledges that someone who is merely
denied a single benefit due to unlawful status may be better off than someone who is
placed directly into deportation proceedings or denied entry at the border, but Pham also
emphasizes that the importance of the denied benefit, especially if coupled with the denial
of other essential benefits (medical care and housing, for example), can make the inaccessibility of such benefits tantamount to exclusion at the border. Id. at 1125. Indeed, for
proponents of such policies, the goal is to make continued unlawful presence so difficult
that it results in "self-deportation:" Id. at 1144-45.While it is unclear exactly how effective
such mechanisms are at encouraging self-deportation, there is some evidence, particularly
in the context of state and local enforcement laws, that these policies cause widespread
flight of immigrants. Id. at 1126. As the legislative findings of the recent Arizona law, S.B.
1070, indicate, causing flight is precisely the point. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Sess.
(Ariz. 2010), available athttp://wvw.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf ("The
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the
public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this
act are intended to work together to discourage and deter unlawful entry and presence of
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.").
77.
Pham, supra note 18, at 1118. The significance of employers as screeners is interesting in light of statements made by Senator Simpson at the time IRCA was debated:
"the Federal law relative to the knowing hiring of illegal aliens will not require employers
to make judgments concerning the authenticity of documentation." Calavita, supra note
6,at 1058.
78.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2047-48 (underscoring the fact
that inmmigration
law is complex and does not lend itself to self-enforcement because, for example, even

Michiganjournal of Race & Law

[VOL. 16:99

sanctions might deter unlawful hiring), the available mechanisms for
document verification and the utter lack of employer training hinder

meaningful enforcement. Instead, the "primary impact of the poorly
designed and minimally enforced employer sanctions was to create a

booming business in fraudulent documents."7 9 Especially in the context of
significant employer discretion, the shortcomings of the available
mechanisms (discussed in the following subsections), make the prospect of
heightened federal employer sanctions problematic for the same reasons
that subfederal regulations are typically preempted by federal law.
1.The 1-9 Process
A commonly-used worker verification mechanism is the 1-9 process.

As a result of the complexity of immigration law and employers' utter
lack of formal training in document verification, employers completing I9 paperwork face a difficult task in trying to recognize valid work author-

ization. 80 Employers can verify work authorization and identity by
reference to any of twenty-seven documents,8 ' many of which are widely

available in fraudulent forms."' While allowing a variety of documents to
prove eligibility ensures that a large portion of the population is able to
people who have entered illegally can legally avoid deportation and regularize status
through a grant of asylum or through employment or family relationships).
79.
PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 86
(2000).
80.
Employers are typically only provided verification training upon a finding of
egregious violation of employer sanctions law, but as of 2007, ICE launched the ICE
Mutual Agreement Between Government and Employers (IMAGE), a voluntary program
that provides education and training on hiring procedures, fraudulent document detection, use of E-Verify, and anti-discrimination requirements. See IMAGE, U.S.
IMMIGRATION

& CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

https://www.ice.gov/image/

(last visited Oct.

25, 2010). Because employer sanctions are generally unenforced, it is unlikely that many
employers have received training in document verification unless they have volunteered
for it.
81.
GAO, CHALLENGES EXIST, supra note 15, at 6. For a list of the eligible documents, see HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS 43-44 (2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/nativedocuments/m-274.pdf.
82.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ECONOMIC CRIMES POLICY TEAM, IDENTITY
THEFT FINAL REPORT 10-13 (1999) (citing the example of wide exploitation of social

security numbers and drivers' licenses as "breeder" documents to secure other legal fomls
of identification). 78,000 fraudulent documents were used to obtain employment for
about 50,000 unauthorized workers in investigations INS completed from 1996 to 1998.
GAO, SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES, supra note 64, at 10. A January 1997 Justice Office of
Inspector General audit report indicated that INS had confiscated 300,000 counterfeit
documents in thirty fraud cases across five INS district offices. Id. Nearly all of the counterfeited documents were confiscated in Los Angeles. Id. In November 1998, INS seized
more than two million counterfeit documents in Los Angeles, including permanent resident cards, Social Security cards, and drivers' licenses from various states, all of which
were headed for distribution points through the country. Id.
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demonstrate work authorization, the number of documents and the variety of forms those documents can take leads to confusion among
employers. Even the Handbook for Employers,83 produced by USCIS, contains only a few examples of valid documents, despite the existence of
several valid circulating versions of each of the twenty-seven acceptable
forms of identification.84 It is problematic that the Handbook offers such
incomplete guidance to employers faced with a multitude of possible
documents in need of verification, but it is not clear that a more comprehensive guide (if it were even feasible to provide and keep constantly upto-date) would solve the problem. Additional examples and guidance
could serve only to further complicate an already-complex process by
adding to the time and expertise required to master the Handbook and
determine the universe of acceptable documentation.5
If the sheer number and variety of eligible documents were not
enough to confuse the process, the documents allowed for verification of
identity and work authorization include "identification documents that
are either easily counterfeited, easy to obtain, or faceless and fungible,
such as social security cards.!' 6 Because fraudulent documentation is so
easily acquired, "[the 1-9 system] makes the verification process a 'don't
ask, don't tell' policy from the standpoint of employers."87' Through the use
of fraudulent documents, unauthorized workers have been able to circumvent the employer verification system, making it difficult, if not
impossible, for willing employers to comply with the law. Even the INS
admitted that "the proliferation of inexpensive fraudulent documents
makes it almost impossible for employers to ensure employment to only
authorized workers.' 88
Adding to the confusion is the fact that work eligibility status itself
is not always clear. Recent estimates suggest that approximately 1 to 1.5
nillion noncitizens in the United States live in a "twilight status," still waiting for their paperwork to be processed after having satisfied the

83.

See

HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS

(2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/

nativedocuments/m-274.pdf
84.
See id. at 43 (2009) ("These pages are not, however, comprehensive because, in
some cases, many variations of a particular document exist and new versions may be published subsequent to the publication date of this Handbook."); see also Collins Foods Int'l
Inc. v. U.S. INS, 948 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the employer did not have
constructive knowledge of employee's unauthorized status due to failure to compare the
employee's fraudulent social security card with the example in the Handbook since the
Handbook only contained one example among many legitimate social security cards in
circulation at the time).
85.
See Steven M. Kaplan, The Employer Sanctions Provision of IRCA: Deterrence of
Discrimination?,6 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 545, 563 (1992).
86.
Manns, supra note 13, at 965 n.339.
87.
Id. at 968 n.348.
88.

GAO,

SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES,

supra note 64, at 9-10.
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requirements to become lawful permanent residents. 89 These individuals
are but one example of a group whose work status would be difficult to
verify by referencing their current documents or government databases.
Because "few, if any, private enforcers have received training in immigration law's complexities," they are "bound to make wrong enforcement
decisions, either in good faith or with discriminatory intent to try to
minimize legal liability."90 Indeed, recognizing the difficulty of determining worker eligibility from paper documents, some employers practice
"defensive hiring," refusing to hire people who look like they might be
unauthorized to work. 91
2. E-Verify: An Attempt to Salvage Work Authorization Verification
In an effort to respond to the difficulty employers face in verifying
paper documents, Congress has explored the use of a national electronic
database through a pilot program, initially called the Basic Pilot and
subsequently dubbed "E-Verify." 92 The program, now operational in all
fifty states, is voluntary for most employers but reform proposals often
suggest making it mandatory,93 and as of 2007, DHS requires all federal
contractors and vendors use E-Verify9 E-Verify will almost certainly
form part of immigration reform proposals, 95 taking the verification of
89.
Lee, supra note 7, at 1117.
90.
Pham, supra note 5, at 811-12.
91.
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law, 109th Cong. 57 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenblum Testimony]
(testimony of Marc Rosenblum, Dept. of Political Science, University of New Orleans).
92.
See GAO, CHALLENGES EXIsT, supra note 15, at 7.
93.
According to a March 2006 Report from the PEW Research Center, more
than two-thirds of the public favored the creation of a database like E-Verify that contains
work eligibility information regarding citizens and legal immigrants, but an even greater
number favored the introduction of a national ID card that applicants would be required
to show to get a job. PEW

RESEARCH CTR., No CONSENSUS ON IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

4 (2006).
94.
Dep't of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff& Dep't of Commerce
Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, Remarks at a Press Conference on Border Security and Administrative Immigration Reforms (Aug. 10, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/releases/pr_ 186781502047.shtm. Chertoff and Gutierrez lament the failure of the
Senate bill that would have made E-Verify mandatory for all employers and say that the
federal government is going to lead by example by requiring federal contractors to enroll
in the program. The Supreme Court granted certiorariin June 2010 in a case challenging
the validity of Arizona's attempt to make use of E-Verify mandatory for state employers.
The petition for certiorariis available at http://www.aclu.org/imniigrants-rights/chamberconulerce-united-states-et-al-v-candelaria-pefition-certiorari (last visited May 10, 2010).
95.
"Not one immigration-reform proposal offered by the Bush Administration,
Congress, or outside advocates presently contemplates repealing employer sanctions, and
nearly all would increase penalties for sanctions violations, increase resources dedicated to
sanctions enforcement, improve online document verification systems, or all of the
OR PROPOSED FIxES: AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION QUANDARY
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paper documents (the 1-9 process) a step further by requiring that employers verify work authorization with the Social Security Administration
(SSA) and/or DHS.
Employers using the E-Verify database enter the employees' information as presented on their work authorization documents and wait for
verification electronically. 96 Because a person who submits a false name or
social security number would theoretically not match the SSA or DHS
databases and would therefore not be confirmed as work-authorized
when queried in the system, use of E-Verify is meant to remove the element of employer discretion and much of the risk of document fraud.97
Unfortunately, the database has an alarming failure rate and has met
with significant employer resistance. As of April 2008, while more than
61,000 employers (of 7.5 million98) had registered for E-Verify, only about
half were active users." In addition to resisting the need for updated
equipment and the time to learn a new system, employers may be reluctant to use the system because of its questionable reliability)'° "[The EVerify] database errors are surprisingly widespread . .. They exist on a
scale that would affect hundreds of thousands and perhaps miflions of
workers in a universal system."' 1 1 Indeed, a "2007 report to the [DHS]
found that 'the database used for verification [was] still not sufficiently up
to date to meet the IIRIRA requirement for accurate verification.' ,,102
Seven percent of queries return an initial, tentative non-confirmation
with the SSA, while about 1 percent result in DHS tentative nonconfirmations. 03
Most of the errors in response to SSA queries are due to changes in
employees' citizenship status or other information, such as name changes,
that have not been updated in SSA's records. 04 When aliens naturalize,
above." Wishnie, supra note 23, at 214--15. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, TALKING POINTS (2007), available at http://nclr.forumnone.com/files/44530-fileEEVS
Talking.Points.pdf; Jeb Bush, Thomas F. Mclarty Ill & Edward Alden, Immingration: Let's

Find Consensus, MIAMI HERALD, July 15, 2009.
96.
Innmigrant Policy Project: E- Verify Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13127 (last visited Oct.

17,2010).
97.

GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER, supra note 46, at 10.

98.

Meissner Testimony, supra note 10.

99.

GAO, CHALLENGES

100.

EXIST,

supra note 46, at Executive Sunmary.

E-Verify's error rate has been estimated at between 4.1 and 6 percent. Alexan-

dra Marks, With E- Verify, Too Many Errors to Expand Its Use?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,

July 7, 2008.
101.
Rosenblum Testimony, supra note 91, at 57.
102.
Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, No. 08-6127, at *11 (10th Cir. Feb. 2,
2010) (citing WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION xxi (2007)), avail-

able at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/lOth/086127p.pdf.
103.

GAO, CHALLENGES EXIST, supra note 15, at 10.

104.

See id.
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their citizenship is recorded in DHS databases but is not updated in the
SSA database. As a result, when their status is queried in SSA through EVerify, a tentative non-confirmation is returned."" Due to changes in
2008, these tentative SSA non-confirmations are immediately sent to
DHS to be checked against their database.0 6 If DHS Sconfirms
authoriza107
tion, E-Verify confirms the person as work authorized. Because of the
lag in updating agency records for naturalized citizens, however, "these
false negatives disproportionately affect persons born outside of the United States""s: "[the] error rate [is] approximately ten percent for
naturalized citizens, and ... foreign-born individuals who are eligible to
work in the United States [are] thirty times [more] likely to receive an
erroneous tentative nonconfirmation [than] U.S.-born employees."0 9 As a
result, "our overall employment verification system becomes a de facto
source of employment discrimination."'
In addition to raising questions of discrimination, E-Verify fails to
rectify the identity fraud issues inherent in the 1-9 system.As with the 1-9
process, "E-Verify is vulnerable to identity fraud or the use by unauthorized immigrants of identity data belonging to other work-authorized
individuals.'
If an unauthorized worker provides someone else's valid
documentation, the program would find the person to be work authorized. Even if the document itself is counterfeit, if it contains valid inforinformation and appears reasonably genuine, E-Verify (like the 1-9 process)
would likely verify the employee's work status."' Consequently, even if used
105.
See id.
106.
NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., BASIC INFORMATION BRIEF: DHS BASIC PlLOT/E-VERIFY PROGRAM (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/
ircaempverif/e-verifyinfobrief_2008-03-13.pdf.
107.
See id.
108.
Rosenblum Testimony, supra note 91, at 58.
109.
See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 753

(10th Cir. 2010) (citing
(2007)).
110.

WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION XXV

Rosenblum Testimony, supra note 91, at 58. See also ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG.

RESEARCH SERV., UNAUTHORIZED EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES AND OP-

5 (2007) (noting that tentative non-confirmations were frequently returned for
foreign-born work-authorized employees, resulting in "unintentional discrimination
against foreign-born employees").
111.
Meissner Testimony, supra note 10, at 11. In 2007, E-Verify added a photo
tool, meant to help curb identity fraud by allowing employers to examine an exact duplicate of the employment authorization document presented to determine if it has been
doctored or if the person presenting it has substituted a new photograph on an original
document. See Dep't of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff & Dep't of
Comnmerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, Remarks at a Press Conference on Border Security and Administrative Inniigration Reforms (Aug. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1186781502047.shti. Of course, this only helps if the
document presented contains a photograph.
112.
GAO, WEAKNESSES HINDER, supra note 46, at 11.
TIONS
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by a majority of employers, the database would not solve the significant
problem of"false positives," people who appear to be work-authorized but
are not. In addition, it would "continufe] to wrongly non-confirm too
many U.S. citizens and legal immigrants, a problem of'false negatives' which
is costly to American businesses and workers.""'
The significant shortcomings of both the 1-9 process and E-Verify
have played a role in IRCA's employer sanctions' inability to effectively
prohibit unauthorized employment. Rather than discourage unlawful migration by decreasing the job magnet, the failed implementation of
employer sanctions has increased workplace discrimination, eroded wages
and working conditions for U.S. workers, and undermined "public safety
and homeland security by driving millions of undocumented immigrants
and their families into the shadows of civic life."'" 14 Moreover, "[g]iven that
sanctions are rarely enforced, result in only small fines when they are enforced, and are structured in ways designed to undermine aggressive
enforcement, it is hard to believe that the sanctions send any serious border
control message."' 5 Even in reaffirming the importance of combating the
job magnet underlying much of illegal migration, the U.S. Commission
on Immigration Reform (mandated by the Immigration Act of 1990)
stated in 1994 that "[t]he ineffectiveness of employer sanctions, prevalence
of fraudulent documents, and continued high numbers of unauthorized
workers .. . have
challenged the credibility of current worksite enforce' 16
ment efforts."
Lukewarm enforcement sends the message that the United States is
not serious enough about controlling illegal immigration "to dedicate the
political and financial resources necessary to make employer sanctions
effective.""117 Jeffrey Manns suggests that "[t]he nominal enforcement of
this law is likely worse than having no law at all, as it has fostered norms

113.
Meissner Testimony, supra note 10, at 11-12. Even putting aside the issues of
accuracy with the program, significant concerns remain regarding USCIS staffs ability to
handle a huge influx of employers if the program becomes mandatory. As of 2006,
USCIS only had thirty-eight inmmigration status checkers to complete any secondary
verifications resulting from tentative non-confirmations. USCIS officials have "serious
concerns about [USCIS's] ability to complete timely verifications if the number of [E-

Verify] users greatly increased." GAO,

WEAKNESSES

HINDER,

supra note 46, at 13. In

addition, E-Verify may raise privacy concerns because anyone wanting access to the
system could pose as an employer and gain access to employee information by signing a
Memorandum of Understanding with the E-Verify program. Implementing controls to
verify employer authenticity may require making information from other agencies, such as
the IRS, available to USCIS, possibly raising additional privacy concerns.
114.
Wishnie, supra note 23, at 195.
115.
Pham, supra note 5, at 818.
116.
U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1994 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xii
(1994), availableat http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.pdf.

117.

Pham, supra note 5, at 818.
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of formalistic
compliance with the law, but subversion of the law's sub11 8
stance."
Though Manns responds by echoing congressional calls to heighten
enforcement of employer sanctions (albeit through a fairly major rethinking of the program), " 9 this Note argues that the response should not be to
blame lax enforcement and call for the enhancement of sanctions. Having
been delegated limited powers, employers are effectively acting as immigration officers, much like subfederal immigration enforcement actors.
Though the employer sanctions scheme cannot be preempted by federal
law because it is federal law, the next section exposes the similarities between the problems of federal employer sanctions and subfederal
immigration enforcement and suggests that calls to increase employer
sanctions can only exacerbate the issues created by inmigration federalism: a lack of uniformity in the application of federal immligration law
and increased discrimination.

II.

FEDERAL

ExcLusivITY

IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Because the 1986 enactment of IRCA made employer sanctions a
part of federal immigration regulation, the federal employer sanctions
scheme is, of course, not preempted by federal law (it is federal law). 20
However, in establishing a federal employer sanctions mechanism, Congress explicitly preempted the use of subfederal employer sanctions
schemes (with the exception of "licensing and similar laws"U 1), suggesting
that there is some desire to have federal control particularly well-

118.
Manns, supra note 13, at 944 n.252.
119.
See id.
120.
While employer sanctions are not themselves preempted, Hiroshi Motomura's
discussion of "institutional competence" may offer a doctrinal framework for understanding the problem. In The Rights of Others, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1737-38 (2010), Motomura
discusses Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), which held that the Civil Service Commission could not adopt a rule barring noncitizens from federal employment
even if another branch of the federal government could-and indeed, the President successfully passed an Executive Order to that effect. Motomura notes that the Court seems
to suggest that even where there is federal authority to take action, not all federal exercises of that authority are equally acceptable. The Civil Service Comnission in Hampton
lacked what Motomura calls the "institutional competence" to adopt the rule. The idea of
"institutional competence" may be a helpful means of characterizing the argument this
Note makes: Though employer sanctions are a federal enforcement mechanism, employers themselves may lack the "institutional competence" to properly enforce immigration
law.
121.
8 U.S.C. § 274A(h)(2) (2006). This clause has given rise to recent litigation
regarding the scope of this savings clause. See Chicanos Pnr La Causa v. Napolitano, 544
F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub num. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria,
78 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
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maintained in the area of employment screening. 122 Despite this expression of the importance of federal control, IRCA's employer sanctions
program has resulted in a broad delegation of immigration enforcement
power that raises the same problems posed by decentralized immigration
authority at the subfederal level.
A. The Recent Increase in Attempts at Subfederal Immigration Enforcement
"With a limited force of approximately 2,000 immigration investigators, and the number of illegal immigrants outnumbering federal agents
5,000 to 1," some consider "the use of state enforcement ...essential to
the efficient and effective enforcement of federal immigration laws."' 23
Indeed, since 2007, subfederal legislative activity in the area of immigration enforcement has been on the rise. The National Conference of State
Legislatures reported that in the first quarter of 2008, legislative activity
on the subject of imiigrants continued to increase significantly, with forty-four state legislatures considering more than one thousand bills relating
to immigrants, and twenty-six states enacting forty-four laws and thirtyeight resolutions relating to immigrants.12
For example, the town of Hazelton, Pennsylvania, which had experienced an influx of Latino immigrants after 9/11, passed the Illegal
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, which suspended the business license
of anyone who "employed, retained, aided, or abetted illegal immigrants.!' 12 In Virginia, lawmakers inPrince William County unanimously
approved one of the toughest laws on unlawful migration, allowing police
officers to check immigration status "of anyone accused of breaking the
law even if the officer merely suspects the person is an illegal immigrant"
and "provid[ing] for the denial of county services ....includ[ing] business
licenses, drug counseling, housing assistance, and services for the elderly"
due to unlawful immigration status. 12 6 Similarly, the township of Riverside, New Jersey passed an ordinance making it unlawful to hire illegal

122.

IRCA expressly preempts local/state employer sanctions mechanisms in

§ 274A(h)(2). See Immigration and Nationality Act § 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324
(2006). Case law on preemption of state employer sanctions mechanisms in particular is in
disarray. In express disagreement with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chicanos Por La
Causa, 544 F.3d 976, the Tenth Circuit ruled in February 2010 that an Oklahoma statute
mandating use of E-Verify is preempted by federal law. See Chamber of Commerce v.
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010). In June 2010, however, the Supreme Court
granted an application for certiorari in the Ninth Circuit case.
123.
Ndulo, supra note 17, at 851.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2055.
124.
Ndulo, supra note 17, at 858-59.
125.
126.
Id. at 857-58.
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immigrants or to rent, lease, or obtain profit from the use of personal
property by illegal immigrants. 27
Such subfederal laws are not a new phenomenon, as our country's
immigration laws were entirely subfederal until Civil War Reconstruction
bolstered the ideas of national citizenship and the supremacy of the federal government.1 28 With the emergence of a national identity came the idea
that "the federal government possesses a plenary and exclusive power to
regulate imnigration, and that the national government's exercise of this
power has wholly ousted any state role in regulating ... immigration
law.' 29 Despite the fact that states had historically been heavily involved
in the regulation of aliens and immigration, 30 "by 1875, the Supreme
Court came to see immigration control as an implicit federal power, inextricably related to the power over foreign affairs."' 3' Thus, the enactment
of "direct federal regulation [of immigration] established the general rule
that federal statutes, by occupying
the immigration field, preempt sub' 3
federal imnigration laws. 1
Though the infamous Chinese Exclusion case3 3 declared that ismnigration law, because of its potential to affect foreign policy, is exclusively a
federal power that "cannot be granted away,' 1 34 it has become clear that
the federal government has authority to delegate some of its exclusive
127.
Id. at 858.
128.
See Motonmura, supra note 68, at 2056.
129.
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Etiforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1088 (2004).
130.
Manheim, supra note 49, at 942. For a broader discussion of the history of
American immigration law and the interplay between state and federal regulation, see
Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century qf Americai Immi-ration Law (1776-1875), 93 CoLuM.
L. REV. 1833 (1993).
131.
Manheim, supra note 49, at 943. See also id. at 940 ("State and local governments
have no constitutional power to regulate foreign affairs. It is not merely that such power is
specifically denied to them by the Constitution.... Power over foreign affairs is a concomitant of national sovereignty, a feature never possessed by the individual states."); Peter
J. Spiro, Learning to Live with hnmigration Federalisn, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1642-44
(1997) (suggesting that other countries consider measures like California's Proposition 187
to be an example of perceived discrimination and mistreatment of aliens that could "poison" inter-country relationships, resulting in trade and investment losses). Indeed, it is the
possibility of interference with national sovereignty and foreign affairs that is most conmonly cited as the justification for Congress's plenary power in immigration enforcement.
See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest
duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be
subordinated.... The government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for
protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the
powers shall be called forth.... ).
132.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2057.
133.
Ciae Chat Ping, 130 U.S. at 581 (upholding the constitutionality of a federal
law flatly prohibiting entry of all Chinese laborers).
134.
Id. at 609.
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control over immigration enforcement to subfederal entities. Indeed, using employers as immigration screeners is an example of such delegation.
But the decentralization of federal control in an area with such farreaching consequences is normatively troubling, as the following section
demonstrates through an examination of the values protected by the
preemption doctrine in the context of subfederal immigration enforcement.
B. Preemption Doctrine in the Immigration Context
Subfederal regulation of immigration is on the rise, due in large part
to states' frustration with what they see as a lack of federal enforcement.
But it "is one of the 'great silences of the Constitution'" that "states may
not usurp or obstruct federal power, even when that power remains unexercised."' While there is no preemption of local/state enforcement of the
criminal law provisions of INA,136 regulation of civil violations of immigration law is generally considered to be under the exclusive purview of the
federal government, with states having no authority to enforce civil violations or determine conditions of entry/exclusion.'13 This presumption of
exclusively federal authority, however, has not deterred states and localities
from attempting to regulate immigrants, and some scholars and policymakers consider this subfederal activity (like the use of employers as
screeners) a necessary "quintessential force multiplier.
For the purposes
of this Note it is not necessary to take sides in the debate about the constitutionality of subfederal enforcement, 3 9 as the discussion of IRCA's
135.
Manheim, supra note 49, at 946.
136.
See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983); Teresa Wynn
Rosenburgh, Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens: Memorandum
Opinion for the U.S. Attorney Southern District of California (Feb. 5, 1996), http://
www.justice.gov/olc/immstopola.htm.
137.
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) (insisting that "it is the business of
the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of... the States ... to
regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens"). But see Memorandum from
Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Off of Legal Counsel (Apr. 3, 2002) (asserting
state governments' "inherent authority" for immigration enforcement); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REv. 787 (2008)
(suggesting that although the vast majority of scholars deny the propriety of immigration
federalism, the text and structure of the Constitution do not withdraw immigration authority from the states in favor of the national government but rather allow for shared
authority).
138.
Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: Vie Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 182 (2006) (describing local
police arrest authority as "inherent" and affirming the Office of Legal Counsel 2002 opinion saying the same).
139.
The debate over the constitutionality of immigration federalism is heated and
ongoing. Compare id. (discussing the inherent authority of local forces to make imnigration-related arrests) and Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State &
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employer sanctions is one of normative rather than strictly constitutional
implications; however, an analysis of the preemption doctrine serves to
illuminate the relevant values undermined by the use of employer sanctions. This section outlines preemption doctrine in the imfigration
context to illustrate the values that would be underimned by a heightened scheme of employer sanctions: uniformity of a complex federal
immigration scheme and avoidance of discrimination.
Subfederal laws can either be expressly or impliedly preempted by
federal regulation.Where preemption is not made explicit in the language
of the federal statute, subfederal laws can be impliedly preempted through
either conflict or field preemption, both of which can inform the discussion of the problems of federal employer sanctions. Conflict preemption
"occurs when either 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is
a physical impossibility,' or 'where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'"40 Field preemption, which occurs "where 'the depth and
breadth of a congressional scheme ...occupies the legislative field,'141
suggests that even if subfederal enforcement is not in conflict with federal
laws, such enforcement may be unjustified given the expansiveness of
Congress's top-down regulation. Where Congress has intended to "occupy the field" of immigration, subfederal regulations and private employer
decisionmaking might interfere with the uniformity of federal regulation.
Before IRCA's passage and the creation of federal employer sanctions, the U.S. Supreme Court in De Canas v. Bica"4 underscored the fact
that the "[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a
federal power ...[b]ut the Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration
and thus per se preempted by this constitutional power, whether latent or
exercised."'' 3 The Court avoided declaring a bright-line rule of preempLocal Enforcement in the Reah of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 323 (2005)
(discussing the need for state/local intervention in immigration law) with Phan, supra note
18, at 966 (describing Attorney General Ashcroft's announcement of inherent authority to
enforce immigration law as a reversal in position), and Wishnie, supra note 129 (describing
Attorney General Ashcroft's announcement regarding states' "inherent authority" to enforce immigration laws as legally incorrect).
140.
Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) petition for cert. granted sub non. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 78 U.S.L.W.
3762 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).

141.

Id.

142.
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 352 (1976) (upholding California Labor Code
2805(a), which prohibited employers from "knowingly employ[ing] an alien who is not

entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers") (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West
2003)).
143.
Id.at 344-55. In 1986, however, Congress passed IRCA, explicitly preempting
state and local employer sanctions schemes (except licensing and similar laws) in 8 U.S.C.
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tion whenever subfederal laws even remotely touch on immigration or
innigrants. Instead, the Court simply noted that "there are situations in
which state regulation, although harmonious with federal regulation, must
nevertheless be invalidated under the Supremacy Clause."1 4 The De Canas
Court determined that where local regulation has a "purely speculative
and indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would
be powerless to authorize or approve.' 45 According to this reasoning, it
presumably follows that if regulations demonstrating only a speculative
and indirect impact on immigration are acceptable, regulations with a
non-speculative and direct impact may trespass into territory reserved for
the federal government.116
Since De Canas, attempts at subfederal regulation of immigration
have been invalidated for departing from federal definitions of unlawful
presence, 4 1 for using standards other than those authorized by the federal
government, 4 8 for conflicting with federal interpretations,4 and for interfering with the federal government's attempt to strike a "balance between
finding and removing undocumented immigrants without accidentally
removing immigrants and legal citizens, all without imposing too much of

§ 1324a(h)(2) (2006). While De Canas is still good law, its holding with regard to state
employer sanctions mechanisms is no longer entirely accurate.
144.
De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357-58.

145.

Id. at 355-56.

146.

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 769 (C.D.

Cal. 1995) (reading De Canas to indicate that preemption applies to state regulatory
schemes concerning immigration where such schemes have more than a "purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration").
147.
In Farmers Branch, Texas, a law was passed requiring any lessor of rental hous-

ing to have "evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration status for each tenant family"
based on eligibility for federal housing subsidies (which might have excluded certain
noncitizens who were in the states lawfully but nonetheless did not qualify for federal
subsidies-students, for example). Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch,
496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762 (N.D. Tex. 2007). Because the Farmers Branch ordinance
strayed from the federal definitions of unlawful presence, the court found preemption
relatively easily.
148.
Equal Access Education v. Merten involved an opinion by the Virginia Attorney
General prohibiting unlawful inimigrants from enrolling in Virginia's public institutions of
higher education, which the court said would be preempted if Virginia were to use standards other than those outlined under federal law. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325
F. Supp. 2d 655, 660-72 (E.D. Va. 2004); Motomura, supra note 68, at 2061.

149.
In Mauro Roldan-Santoyo, Int. Dec. 3377, 1999 WL 126433, *1, *12 (BIA
1999) (reversed by the Ninth Circuit as applied to first-time drug offenses, since it conflicted with the Federal First Offender Act, see Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th
Cir. 2000)), the Board of Immigration Appeals held that giving effect to various state drug
rehabilitation statutes would conflict with Congress's desire for a uniform immigration
standard by changing the meaning of "conviction" and attendant immigration consequences.
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a burden on employers and workers."'' 0 The argument for federal preemption of local immigration enforcement mechanisms and other ordinances
that "create circumstances that [affect] the flow of immigrants into the
applicable state""'i' is that immigration law was intended to be an exclu-

sively federal power.
Federal exclusivity furthers uniformity in
immigration law by avoiding a variety of enforcement approaches and
techniques that could result in the problem of"a thousand borders.'5 3
C. Exception to the Preemption of Subfederal Enforcement: 287(g)Agreements
While many subfederal ordinances have been invalidated and some
commentators suggest that federal immigration power is "incapable of
transfer" and "cannot be granted away,'' 5 4 there are limited instances in
which the federal government has expressly authorized delegations of
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 527-28 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
150.
The District Court in Lozano struck down several local ordinances requiring proof of
lawful residence despite the apparent use of federal immigration standards because of concern that the local laws would over-enforce federal immigration law. By contrast, the
District Court in Garrett v. City of Escondido feared the local law would undermine federal
immigration enforcement by overburdening the federal databases used to check unlawful
presence at the local level. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1057
(S.D. Cal. 2006). These contrasting opinions lend credence to the idea that there is a
delicate balance struck by federal standards with which subfederal laws might interfere. See
also Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742, 769 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding
that Oklahoma's attempt to make E-VeriFy mandatory at the state level undermined Congress's "carefully constructed balance" in allowing voluntary use of the pilot program,
which has many documented failings and leads to inaccurate determinations of work eligibility).
151.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1971) (holding that local laws
affecting flow of immigrants encroach upon the federal government's exclusive immigration power).
152.
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) ("The power
of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government
of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, the
right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of
the country require it, cannot be granted away or retrained on behalf of anyone."); Pham,
supra note 18, at 1141-42 (asserting that "[t]he federal government's authority to exercise
inmigration powers-and to exercise it exclusively-is clear" and that the Supreme
Court has indicated (and reiterated in multiple cases) that "the immigration power belongs exclusively to the federal government").
153.
Id. at 995.
154.
Wishnie, supra note 129, at 1089 (Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609 (1889)).
Following the Office of Legal Counsel's publication of its 2002 memo suggesting that
states have some "inherent authority" to regulate immigration, see Memorandum from
Assistant Attorney Gen. Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel (Apr. 3, 2002), there has
been much debate (which exceeds the scope of this Note, see supra notes 138-139 and
accompanying text) about whether Congress really does have exclusive power with regard to immigration such that delegation would be necessary to bring about subfederal
authority.

FALL 2010]

Federal Employer Sanctions

immigration enforcement power to subfederal entities."' Under INA
§ 2 8 7(g),156 adopted through IIRIRA,"' immigration enforcement authority may be delegated to state and local law enforcement agencies
5
through the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)."
Depend2
ing on the terms of the MOA, 87(g) authority can include not only the
power to arrest, but also the power to investigate immigration violations,
collect evidence and put together a case for prosecution or removal, take
custody of aliens on behalf of the federal government, and other powers
of immigration enforcement. 5 9 Before exercising this authority, however,
designated agency officials must undergo extensive training to be crossdeputized as immigration officers and must submit to federal supervision by
sworn ICE officers.160 "Though only a small fraction of... subfederal government entities have entered into MOAs, 161 . .. such express delegation of

enforcement power(s)
... renders moot the question" of preemption in
62
these contexts.1
155.
Yet even delegations of federal authority have been questioned as potentially
violative of the constitutional requirement of uniform citizenship standards. See In re Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.Y. 2001) (invalidating a New York state
restriction on Medicaid benefits for only lawfully present noncitizens because the federal
government cannot delegate its authority to the states if the states' use of such authority
undermines federal uniformity).
156.
8 U.S.C. § l357(g) (2006).
157.
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 546 (1996) (codified across
various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
158.
Fact Sheet: Delegation of Jnimigration Authority Section 287() Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.

IMMIGRATION &

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/

library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). See Motomura, supra note 68, at
2058. The only other mention of local and state enforcement in the INA is in response to
"an actual or imminent influx" of aliens presenting "urgent circumstances requiring an
immediate Federal response," which allows local officers to perform what is normally
exclusively a federal function. INA § 103(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(10).
159.

See Kobach, supra note 138, at 197; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IM-

MIGRATION

ENFORCEMENT:

BETTER

CONTROLS

NEEDED

OVER

PROGRAM

AUTHORIZING

STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS 2 (2009) [hereinafter GAO,
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED]. 287(g) agreements go beyond state and local officers' exist-

ing ability to obtain immigration status information from ICE and to alert ICE to any
removable aliens they identify. Under these agreements, state and local officers have direct
access to ICE databases and act as ICE agents by processing aliens for removal. They are
authorized to initiate removal proceedings by preparing a notice to appear in immigration
court and transporting aliens to ICE-approved detention facilities for further proceedings.
Id. at 7.
160.
Fact Sheet: Delegation of inigration Authority Section 287(g) Inimigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMaMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/
library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010); GAO, BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED, supra note 159, at 2.
161.
The first such agreement was signed in 2002, and by October 2008 there were
sixty-seven state and local agencies with 28 7 (g) agreements. See GAO, BETTER CONTROLS
NEEDED, supra note 159, at 2.
162.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2058.
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The allowance for subfederal involvement under § 287(g) indicates
congressional intent to allow local intrusion in immigration enforcement
"only pursuant to a detailed congressional scheme, guaranteeing federal
training, supervision and oversight." 63 Thus, the 287(g) exception demonstrates that oversight and training should be central to any local enforceenforcement efforts and that those efforts, while seen as crucial to the
federal enforcement of immigration law, should remain limited both in
scope and number. The limited nature of this federal delegation of authority, requiring extensive training and supervision, suggests that
immigration enforcement is a particularly sensitive type of regulation not
amenable to federalist division - at least not without training and federal
oversight to maintain uniformity and avoid abuses of discretion.
III.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREEMPTION AND THE

287(g)

EXCEPTION

Because federal imingration enforcement is a complex balancing
scheme, decentralization of enforcement power can be problematic.
Where limited immigration enforcement power has been delegated, however, the federal government has required training and supervision in an
effort to minimize the highly discretionary nature of immigration enforcement. Maintaining centralized authority in immigration enforcement
is crucial to avoid undermining the uniformity of the comprehensive federal scheme and creating conflicts with federal law, the primary purposes
of preemption doctrine. This section outlines the ways in which calls to
increase employer sanctions raise the very issues that the preemption doctrine seeks to avoid.
64

A. Subfederal and Private-EmployerEnforcement Threaten Uniormity'

In the years following 9/11, Congress and the Department of Justice
have increasingly enlisted the support of state and local police in the routine enforcement of federal immigration laws, despite preemption
questions and the potential to undermine the uniformity of federal im163.
Wishnie, supra note 129, at 1095. It is clear that Congress intended 287(g) authority to provide ICE with greater resources in the form of state and local law
enforcement officers. See GAO, BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED, supra note 159, at 9. In
2006, Congress expressly provided funding to facilitate the 287(g) program as part of
DHS appropriations. Id. However, conmmittee reports accompanying subsequent appropriations have emphasized the importance of ICE's supervisory and training duties prior
to delegating "limited innigration enforcement functions." Id. Program participants must
pass a background investigation and are required to undergo four weeks of training on
immigration law (including identification of fraudulent documents) and pass mandatory
examinations to be certified. Id. at 20.
164.
See Huntington, supra note 137, at 828 (citing uniformity as an important value
in any debate on the devolution of federal power).
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migration law.165 As with subfederal involvement, increasing the enforcement role of private employers through heightened employer sanctions
will "magnify the consequences of differences in the interpretation of unlawful presence.' 6 6 Increased private involvement means "more
decisionmakers who can make mistakes or exercise discretion in deciding
whether or not to assist in immigration law enforcement."'' 67 Enlarging
the group of actors authorized to make discretionary immigration enforcement decisions would not be as problematic if "immigration law as
set forth in the [INA] and other federal enactments [were] essentially
simple and self-executing."' 168 Given the difficulties of accurately determining immigration status, however, "it is pivotal to ask who makes the
decisions," 6 9 as federal immigration decisionmaking has wide-ranging
effects that are made farther-reaching by the extension of immigration
authority.
1. Subfederal Regulation
States and localities attract immigrants at different rates 17 and have
different reactions to the resulting population growth. Therefore, if given
the authority to affect federal regulation, subfederal entities "will enforce
federal immigration laws with varying degrees of vigor and resources,
and some will continue to opt out of enforcement. [As a result], noncitizens will be more or less vulnerable depending on where they live
and travel! 171 Indeed, subfederal regulations run the gamut from prohibiting landlords' renting to noncitizens 7 2 to issuing municipal identification
cards to all residents regardless of immigration status to ensure equal

165.
166.
167.

Wishnie, supra note 129, at 1085.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2068-69.
Id.

168.
169.

Id. at 2063-64.
Id.
Indeed, for the first
time in a long time, California's dominance as a destination

170.
of choice is declining, with Colorado, Georgia, Nevada, and North Carolina seeing their
foreign-born populations grow at more than double the national average. Though San
Francisco and Los Angeles are still major destinations, along with historically popular
Chicago and New York, immigrants are increasingly choosing Atlanta, Georgia; Dallas,
Texas; Denver, Colorado; Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and Washington, D.C.
See AUDREY SINGER, BROOKINGS INST., THE RISE OF NEW IMMIGRANT GATEWAYS 1-7

(2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/urban/pubs/20040301-gateways.pdf.
171.
Huntington, supra note 137, at 843.
172.
See id. at 803 (citing, among other anti-immigrant laws, the California (Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38 R § 3 (Oct. 18, 2006)), Georgia (Cherokee County, Ga.,
Ordinance 2006-003 (Dec. 5, 2006)), and Texas (Fanners, Branch, Tex. Ordinance 2903
(May 12, 2007)) ordinances prohibiting rental to unlawfully present individuals).
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access to local public services.1' 3 These varying interpretations and applications of immigration enforcement lead to what has been called the
"'thousand borders' problem, violating the constitutional mandate for
uniform immigration laws as local authorities will enforce federal immigration laws differently, creating, in effect, different immigration
laws."'74
While subfederal governments may see their intervention into
inmiigration regulation as filling holes left by the federal government,
Hiroshi Motomura points out that "de facto policy is still policy, and
federal immigration law is a matter of inaction as much as affirmative
decisionmaking. Consequently, any decisions by state and local officials
put them in conflict with the knowing balance of enforcement and
tolerance that constitutes actual federal immigration law."'' 71 Federal
in-imigration policy is decidedly complex, and federal policies can run in
seemingly contradictory directions, such as when "Congress elects to
permit employment of undocumented workers, extends labor law
protection to them, and provides them with free medical care, despite

efforts to prohibit their entry.'176

Given this complex scheme, "state self-help may complicate national
efforts. It ought not be left to each state to determine how best to effectuate federal policies."'' 7 The argument in favor of preemption (or against
federalism in the immigration context) suggests that having one topdown implementation process for enforcement avoids the problem of
varying degrees of enforcement activity that may or may not reflect the
federal government's choices. 178 This uniformity is particularly important
in the imnigration context because "[i]migration policy not only
speaks to the nation's vision of itself, it also signals its position in the
world and its relationships with other nation-states. At one level this
means that foreign policy invariably becomes implicated in the formulation of immigration policy."' 179 Thus, while the debate about the
constitutionality of state and local measures rages on, one thing is clear:

173.
See id. at 803-04 (citing, among other examples of immigrant-friendly laws,
New Haven and San Francisco's issuance of ID cards regardless of inmfigration status).
174.
Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inhlerent Authority Position: Why Inviting
Local Enforcement of nzmigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965,
995 (2004).
175.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2063.
176.
Manheim, supra note 49, at 999.
177.
ld.
178.
See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 541 (M.D. Pa.
2007) (discussing the discretionary nature of local enforcement mechanisms, including
landlord and employer enforcement, and the strong possibility of discrimination given the
amount of discretion).
179.

MAE M. NGAI,

MODERN AMERICA 9

IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:

(2004).

ILLEGAL ALIENS AND

THE MAKING

OF
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normatively speaking, there is much to be said for utilizing federal exclusivity to protect uniformity in the enforcement of inrnigration law.
2. Employer Enforcement
Just as subfederal regulations threaten innigration uniformity, employer sanctions "magniqy] variations in the meaning of unlawful
presence and broaden[ ] the range of discretion in immigration law enforcement ....[Similarly,] state and local immigration law enforcement
introduces incentives, motives, and priorities that may be in tension with
even-handed federal enforcement.0 80 Preemption doctrine indicates that
subfederal regulations cannot stand where they have more than a trivial
impact on immigration enforcement, interfere with the uniform application of delicately balanced federal standards, or otherwise conflict with
federal law.'8 While employer enforcement can be said to be more indirect than the direct enforcement of detention and removal, there is no
question that the federal employer sanctions scheme was put in place to
have a substantial impact on flows of migration, directly contributing to
the weakening of the job magnet. 8 Therefore, the discretionary decisions
that employers make were intended to have a substantial, direct impact on
immigration law, such that they constitute a nontrivial delegation of immigration authority. Given the sheer number of employers with
enforcement authority, it is likely that their decisions will, on frequent
occasion, depart from federal definitions of unlawful presence, use standards other than those authorized by the federal government, conflict with
federal interpretations, or interfere with the federal government's attempt
to strike a delicate balance.
With both private employers and subfederal regulations, the influence of the varying regional impacts of immigration also leads to wide
variation in the application of enforcement mechanisms. Employers in
some areas might feel great pressure to bring in immigrant labor, while
others feel more pressure to keep immigrants out to avoid changing local
demographics, and still others feel isolated from immigration and are not
part of the debate.183 Previous experience with individual immigrant
employees or groups from certain countries may also influence
180.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2069-70.
181.
In response to the Ninth Circuit's ruling in CPLC v. Napolitano, a New York
Times editorial piece called for President Obama and the Supreme Court to "vindicate the
nation's interest in having uniform inmiigration policies, and to stop the spread of local
laws that can make achieving real worthwhile national reform harder." Editorial, An llegal Immigration Patchwork, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 2009, at A42.

182.
See discussion in Introduction, supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
183.
See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (discussing the discretionary nature of local
enforcement mechanisms, including landlord and employer enforcement, and the strong
possibility for discrimination given the amount of discretion).
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particular
employers'
application of the law in both positive and negative
• •
184
directions. Especially in the context of the current economic crisis
where anti-immigrant sentiment is common, increased implementation of
employer verification at the level of individual, private employers may
exacerbate discrimination "caused by plain, old-fashioned animus. Private
enforcement laws can certainly not be blamed for creating this anirius,
but they do provide the perfect cover.""'8 Converselyjust as some subfederal entities have implemented immigrant-friendly policies,8 6 so might
some well-meaning employers seek to skirt federal requirements for the
benefit of 8 unauthorized
workers or simply to maintain the necessary
7
workforce.
In addition to subfederal entities' and employers' wide variations in
motivation and attitudes toward immigrant populations, the lack of immigration enforcement training in both contexts further exacerbates the
potential for differential enforcement at the subfederal level. Though expected to recognize government documents as fraudulent or valid, which
often requires a fairly sophisticated understanding of imn-igration status,
employers receive no formal training until they are thought to be in violation of IRCA." 8 Subfederal agencies that take enforcement upon
themselves often insist that they are merely applying federal standards in
verifying immigration status, but without training in immigration law,
they are equally likely to make mistakes.

184.
Huntington, supra note 137, at 806 (describing the fact that more punitive immigration measures are often enacted in areas new to receiving significant populations of
non-citizens). Huntington points out, however, that until 1952 the federal government
had explicitly race-based irmmigration laws in effect, suggesting that there's no reason to
think that a uniform federal policy will be any more protective of individual rights than
regional/state enforcement. Id. at 834.
185.
Pham, supra note 5, at 826. Pham refers here to the local immigration enforcement actions proposed/adopted in recent years, but anti-immigrant sentiment may have
similar effects on employers' enforcement of imigration law.
186.
See Huntington, supra note 173, for the example of issuance of identification
cards for use in receipt of public benefits regardless of immigration status.
187.
Given the lack of available legal alternatives, many employers feel forced to
augment their workforce by hiring unauthorized workers, especially in areas subject to
seasonal increases in demand. For example, "Mr. Gilsdorf was able to fill his labor force
with legal immigrants from Mexico through a federal guest worker program. But that
program has a tight annual cap, and Mr. Gilsdorf realized that he might not be so lucky
next year. His business could fail, he said, and then even his American workers would
lose their jobs. 'We're not hiring illegals, we're not paying under the table,' Mr. Gilsdorf
said. 'But if we don't get in under the cap and nobody is answering our ads, we don't
have employees.' His group, Colorado Employers for Imnigration Reform, is pressing
Congress for a much larger and more flexible guest worker program." Julia Preston, Enployers Fight Tough Measures on Inromration, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,2008, at Al.
188.

See U.S. IMMIGRATION

& CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, supra note

2007 implementation of a voluntary education and training program).

80 (discussing the
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In contrast, the federal government's formal delegation of immigration authority through 2 8 7 (g) agreements requires that contracting
entities cross-deputize officers and provide training in immigration law. If
employers, as recipients of delegated federal authority, are to act as private
enforcers of immigration law, they should, at the very least, be subject to
some of the same training and cross-deputizing required before 287(g)
agreement-holders are allowed to enforce immigration law at the local
level. Still, training alone may not be enough to avoid problems of delegated authority: despite the fact that 2 87 (g) participants receive some
training and are supposed to be supervised, agencies acting under MOA
authority still have problems maintaining uniform enforcement. ICE has
been criticized for failure to adequately supervise 2 8 7 (g) participants as
statutorily required, and the 2 8 7(g) program itself has been criticized for a
lack of program objectives that would help ensure that participants are
working toward a uniform purpose. 89 "ICE has not described the nature
and extent of the agency's supervision over participating agencies' implementation of the program, [which] has led to wide variation in the
perception of the nature and extent of supervisory responsibility among
ICE field officials.. ,.90These failures make the growing 28 7 (g) program
vulnerable to weakening federal control over local enforcement, thereby
rendering 2 8 7 (g) actors more like other local/state actors not authorized
to broadly enforce immigration law.
Of course, 2 8 7 (g) actors and other interior immigration enforcement mechanisms regulate immigration law in a very direct way, usually
through the use of officers with immigration law training who are authorized to initiate removal proceedings. Employer enforcement, on the
other hand, is qualitatively different because it does not necessarily result
in immediate removal or direct immigration-related consequences. As
discussed earlier, however, employer sanctions were designed to have a
significant impact on migrants' ability to come to and remain in this
country. T9 As a result, just as with subfederal enforcement, heightened
employer sanctions would lead to wide variations in the application of
immigration enforcement. In addition to the various subfederal interpretations of inmmigration law, each place of private employment would
become one of the "thousand borders," representing a threat to national
sovereignty, undermining the uniformity of federal immigration law, and
potentially having a detrimental impact on foreign relations. If truly
enforced, employer sanctions would serve to decentralize immigration
189.

GAO,

BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED,

supra note 159, at *.For example, ICE

claims that a program objective is addressing serious crime, such asdrug smuggling, committed by removable aliens, but four of the twenty-nine program participants reviewed in
the GAO study processed individuals for minor crimes like speeding, contrary to the stated program objective.
190.
Id. at 4.
191.
See Pham, supra note 18, at 1123-24.
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enforcement authority even more broadly than actions taken by subfederal agencies, authorizing and requiring employers to use their considerable
discretion in the context of inaccurate verification mechanisms. Therefore,
the concept of field preemption would suggest that, like subfederal enforcement, employer sanctions should be invalid for undermining the
uniformity of the federal law meant to "occupy the field" of immigration
enforcement.
B. Subfederal and Employer Enforcement Could Exacerbate Discrimination
1. Subfederal Regulation
In the context of local enforcement, many states "fear that local cooperation with federal immigration laws could result in illegal acts such as
racial profiling."'1 92 Unlike federal immigration officers, who receive substantial training, including courses in immigration and nationality law,
local officers are unschooled in complex immigration procedures.193 "A
'lack of training, coupled with [a] lack of hands-on enforcement experience, may tempt local authorities to rely on racial profiling and other
prohibited practices in enforcing immigration laws.' Such effects could be

worsened in communities where anti-inmigrant sentiments

exist.'

' 94

The

recent Arizona law, S.B. 1070,199 which requires local law enforcement to
question people about their in-igration status, provides a perfect example. Backlash to the law, which critics fear will lead to rampant racial
profiling of Latinos, has included criticism from foreign nations, including
Ebrard, who called the measure "planned
Mexico City's mayor, Marcelo
196
Apartheid against Mexicans.'
Even in the context of a 287(g) agreement, which might "moot
constitutional questions of preemption and maybe even equal protection,"
the question remains "about the proper subfederal role, particularly if state
and local measures are rooted in animus against newcomers, especially
America."' 19 7
unlawful migrants who come outside the law from Latin
Over half of the twenty-nine agencies with 2 8 7(g) agreements studied in
Ndulo, supra note 17, at 879. See also Motomura, supra note 120, at 1744 (dis192.
cussing the role that fear of racial and ethnic profiling might play in district court
decisions finding preemption of subfederal inmigration enforcement).
See Ndulo, supra note 17, at 879.
193.
Id.
194.
SB 1070 (49th Ariz. Leg. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/
195.
491eg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf.

See Jonathan S. Cooper & Paul Davenport, Lawsuits Target New Arizona mumi196.
gration Law: State Legislature Oks Changes to aw to Restrict Racial or Ethnic Profiling,
MSNBC.coM (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36853483/ns/us_
news-crime and courts/.
Motomura, supra note 68, at 2064-65.
197.
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a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report cited concerns
from community members that use of the program authority would lead
to racial profiling and intimidation by law enforcement officials.'" Thus,
despite the designated authority and training accompanying a 2 8 7 (g)
agreement, concerns about racial profiling and discrimination (similar to
those raised at the inception of employer sanctions) have contributed to
negative press about this latest enforcement-expanding approach.' 99
"Even before the September 11 attacks, INS regularly engaged in
racial profiling and selective enforcement based on ethnic appearance ....
[Especially in] worksite raids, federal agents [continue to] single out
worksites ....based on the presence of 'Spanish music' or workers of

'Hispanic appearance,' and target individual Latinos-from amidst
ethnically diverse workforces-for questioning, arrest, and prosecution."200
The fact that "even federal immigration officials, trained in the arcania of
immigration law and (presumably) the risks of improper reliance on
profiling, frequently resorted to stereotypes and discrimination, confirms
that the move to enlist or conscript state and local police in ordinary
immigration enforcement is fraught with risk" and the "very real prospect
of expanded, and unlawful, profiling.' 2'0
Equal application of the law is arguably better protected by an exclusively federal scheme not as subject to individual bias at the local
level. 21 2 Federal exclusivity might better protect "the fundamental rights
of individuals and groups, as evidenced by the history of race relations
198.
GAO, BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED, supra note 157, at 6.
199.
See, e.g., ACLU-NC, New Study Finds Dramatic Problems With 287(g) Inmigration
Program, Feb 18. 2009, http://acluofnc.org/?q=new-study-finds-draniatic-problenis287g-immigration-program (discussing the "climate of racial profiling and community
insecurity" created by 2 87 (g) agreements); Napolitano Condemns Arizona Anti-Immigrant
Law, NEw AMERICA MEDIA (Mar. 26, 2010), http://news.newamericamedia.org/
news/view article.htmi?article id=202c1030c42944f3c0876f135bfe276 (chronicling the
protests of the 287 (g) program in Phoenix, Arizona, which critics say has led to "attacking
Latinos" and jailing undocumented irmnigrants for minor violations like traffic stops, so
they could be deported); Franco Ordonez, Union CountyJoins Deportation Program, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 1, 2010, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/
04/01/1348816/union-county-joins-deportation.html (citing the "controversy over civil
liberties issues" surrounding 287(g)); John Harbin, Residents Say Program Too Harsh, BLUE
RIDGE TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, available at http://www.blueridgenow.com/article/
20100328/SEPVICES03/3281083?Tide=PResidents-say-program-too-harsh. Indeed, the
National Inmigration Law Center was able to get 521 organizations/advocates to petition
President Obama, calling for the termination of the 2 87(g) program. See Letter from the
National Immigration Law Center to President Barack Obama (Aug. 25, 2009), available
at http://www.nilc.org/iimnlawpolicy/LocalLaw/287g-Letter-2009-08-25.pdf.
200.
Wishnie, supra note 129, at 1104.
201.
Id. at 1104-05.
202.
"The troubling result is a growing patchwork of punitive statutes bound to
spawn unfairness to businesses and employees while undermining the federal government's proper authority over immigration." Editorial, An Illegal Immigration Patchwork,

N.Y.

TIMES,

Dec. 10, 2009, at A46.
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and the numerous Supreme Court decisions striking down state laws
that infringed on freedom of speech, free exercise, and the rights of criminal defendants."2"3 Of course, an advantage of pluralistic society and
federalist experimentation may be greater protection of individual rights
(as evidenced by the immigrant-friendly policies noted above), and it may
just be an unwarranted assumption that local enforcement leads to greater
discrimination than federal enforcement.2 0 4 However, the presumption is
that federal enforcement, by virtue of its ability to be more uniform across
localities, is less susceptible to local influence and is therefore more protective.
2. Employer Enforcement
Just as the decentralization of power at the subfederal level may
heighten the role that animus, racial profiling, and anti-immigrant sentiment play in imiigration enforcement, employer sanctions are equally
susceptible to local, indeed even individual, feelings of animus. Moreover,
proposals to increase employer sanctions "may result in greater incentives
for discrimination against citizens and legal aliens who appear to be of foreign origin.''20 s Indeed, in the two years following enactment of employer
sanctions, "employers appear[ed] to have anticipated higher levels of enforcement against employing undocumented aliens and ... responded by
significantly heightening discrimination against individuals of foreign origin
regardless of employment status. 206
Discrimination against Latino Americans, Asian Americans, or others
who "looked foreign" was a major concern at IRCA's inception and one
that would be heightened with an increase in the enforcement of employer sanctions. As part of IRCA's passage, Congress required the GAO
203.
Huntington, supra note 137, at 829. Though Huntington cites uniformity and
strong national government as key to advancing fairness and equality, as well as protection of fundamental rights, she does not endorse an exclusively federal approach to
immigration law, preferring instead a system of shared powers between state and federal
governments.
204.
See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2001) (predicting that
states, when faced with economic hard times and resulting nativist sentiment, will "try to
balance their budgets on the backs of indigent immigrants").
205.
Manns, supra note 13, at 970. See also Pham, supra note 18, at 1121-22 (discussing the threat of "permanent borders of discrimination" and the denial of important benefits
inspite of legal status for those who "look like immigrants"). While most commentators focus
on the negative impact racial profiling has on citizens and legal aliens (perhaps because those
are more politically popular populations), it is equally morally problematic to subject unauthorized inmmigrants to treatment solely on the basis of their race or ethnicity.
206.
Manns, supra note 13, at 970. See also Espenoza, supra note 54, at 344-45 (discussing the "new forms of discrimination against Hispanic citizens, Asian citizens, and
authorized foreign workers" that resulted from adoption of IRCA's employer sanctions).
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to prepare three annual reports, which, if they showed widespread discrimination and Congress adopted a joint resolution stating it approved of
the reports' findings, would result in the termination of the employer
sanctions program. 207 The final GAO Report found that national origin
discrimination existed in more than just a few isolated cases; in fact, the
report revealed a serious pattern of discrimination: more than 460,000
employers engaged in illegal national-origin discrimination based on a
person's foreign appearance or accent208 (6.6 percent of employers stopped
hiring applicants who looked or sounded foreign; 8.6 percent only examined documents of employees who looked or sounded foreign; 9.8
percent suspected that applicants with foreign appearances or accents
might be illegal, so employers required them to provide documents before
making a job offer);209 and an additional 430,000
engaged in illegal citi• 210
zenship discrimination in response to sanctions (14.7 percent hired only
applicants born in the U.S., and 13 percent stopped hiring those with only temporary work authorization). 211 Despite these findings, Congress did
not adopt a joint resolution, and employer sanctions remained.212
The GAO data suggested that at least some of the discrimination
was attributable to employer confusion regarding the required verification
process. Surveys revealed that employers who discriminated were more
likely to report that they did not understand the law and were in need of
a better verification system.
It should come as no surprise, therefore,
that "[w]hen enforcers not trained in immigration law are expected to
make immigration determinations, they are going to rely on appearance,
'
accents, and foreign birthplace as proxies for iminigration status."214
Given
207.
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination:The
GAO Study in Perspective,Articles & Chapters, Paper 8, at 806 (1990), available at http://
digitalcormnons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1007&context =articles.
208.
GAO, QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 16, at 38.
209.
Id.at 117, 120.
210.
Id.at 38.
211.
Id.at 120.
212.
In response to the dramatic increase in discrimination as a result of IRCA, a
bipartisan group of senators introduced S. 1734 in an effort to repeal IRCA's employer
sanctions provision in favor of greater focus on border control. S.1734, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991). Senator Orrin Hatch introduced The Employer Sanctions Repeal Act of
1991, S.1734, along with Senators Kennedy, DeConcini, Specter, Brown, Bingaman,
McCain, Cranston, Akaka, Inouye, Wirth and Packwood. 137 CONG. REC. S13, 419
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1991).
213.
GAO, QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 16, at 62-63. See also Pham,
supra note 18, at 1158.
214.
Pham, supra note 18, at 1159. Of course, even with crystal clear requirements
and extensive training, some employers will continue to engage in discriminatory practices either due to animus against specific groups or immigrants more generally, but this
Note intends to highlight the problematic nature of employer sanctions mechanisms from
the perspective of the most willing, compliant, non-discriminatory employer faced with
inadequate verification methods.
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that employers still receive little to no training and are still expected to
rely on faulty verification systems like 1-9 and E-Verify, the increased
threat of employer sanctions liability under congressional proposals means
the likelihood of discrimination remains very real.
Moreover, the threat of discrimination in the employer sanctions
context is not well-nitigated by the availability of legal recourse or antidiscrimination protection. When IRCA was passed, Title VI 21' barred
national origin discrimination but not discriination based on alienage 16, and applied only to employers with fifteen or more full-time
employees.1 7 To fill this loophole, Congress adopted INA § 274B, which
established the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices in the Department ofJustice, to investigate and pursue
charges of employment discrimination based on national origin or citizenship status by employers with four or more employees. 21 " Still, § 274B
covers only citizenship status discrimination against citizens and certain
classes of aliens; 219 even lawful permanent residents are not covered if they
2
do not initiate the naturalization process within six months of eligibility.
Nonimmigrants, even those authorized to work, and parolees are likewise
excluded from § 274B protections. Moreover, unlike Title VII, § 274B
applies only to hiring, referral for' a fee, and firing, and offers no remedy
for discrimination on the job.21 Therefore, existing laws preclude legal
aliens who are not "actively pursuing" naturalization and anyone working
for an employer with three or fewer employees from antidiscrimination
protection, and anyone covered by these provisions is only protected with
regard to hiring, firing, and referral for a fee.222
Where interior enforcement mechanisms lead untrained private enforcers, like employers, to choose discrimination as a means of avoiding
potential liability, individuals singled out for discriminatory treatment on
the basis of their "looking foreign" might "never be able to make the
215.
216.
217.
218.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e-2 (West 2006).
See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2.
See

THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR IMMIGRATION-RELATED UNFAIR EM-

(OSC), http://www.justice.gov/crt/osc/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2010).
219.
Section 274(a)(3)(B) of the Imnnigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1324b
(2006), outlines that lawful permanent residents, newly legalized aliens, refugees and
asylees are covered.
220.
See id. § 274B(a)(3)(B)(i).
221.
See INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b). Congress amended the statute to clarify
the meaning of "discrimination" in section 274B(a)(6), saying that requiring more or
different documents to establish work authorization or refusing to honor facially valid
docunents constitute "an unfair immigration-related employment practice if made for the
purpose or with the intent of discriminating against an individual." INA 5 274B(a)(6), 8
U.S.C. § 1324(b)(a)(6).
222.
Manns, supra note 13, at 970-71.
PLOYMENT
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transition from 'foreigner to governor,' from 'out-group to in-group' in
any meaningful way,' 223 even if they eventually naturalize, have already
naturalized, or have always been citizens by virtue of being born in this
country.24 Like subfederal enforcement motivated by hostility, heightened
employer sanctions that inevitably lead to discrimination reinforce racism,
anti-immigrant sentiment, and animus against Latinos, Asians, and anyone
who looks or sounds foreign. "These discriminatory
messages, whether
22
1
impact.
symbolic
laws'
the
dilute
not,
or
intended
It might be politically difficult to reach a result that both maintains
strict employer sanctions and limits discrimination: it is prohibitively
expensive to educate each individual employer as to avoidance of discrimination and proper use of available verification systems, inadequate though
they are, but even if it weren't, "it is not likely that education [would] alleviate employers' concerns regarding monetary and criminal sanctions
which could result from non-compliance with the sanctions provision. 2' 6
Especially given proposals to remove the "good faith compliance"
standard in favor of a constructive knowledge standard,2 7 employers faced
with
a greater likelihood of sanction will be likely to defensively discrim• 228
mate.
Moreover, because the "default response to employment
discrimination against legal aliens or citizens based on national origin or
citizenship status is the issuance of cease and desist orders," employers
faced with the prospect of heightened sanctions, whether increased civil
penalties or heavier criminal penalties, will see the cease and desist orders
as preferable, making such punishment "far too weak to overcome the
incentives to discriminate against legal aliens' 229 Even employers with no
animus toward immigrants and no interest in discriminating may find that
the increased threat of sanctions without an accompanying increase in the
accuracy of the available verification mechanisms makes discriminating

223.
Pham, supra note 18, at 1162.
224.
Id. The result of this discrimination due to heightened enforcement is the undermining of the "cherished narrative that gaining citizenship means gaining full
membership rights." Id. at 1163. Pham points out the irony that what is designed as a
means of encouraging only lawful entry into the United States weakens the value of that
legal status for people who might naturalize but would still, and always, "look foreign" in
the eyes of discriminatory enforcers. Id.
225.
Pham, supra note 5, at 819.
226.
Kaplan, supra note 85, at 557.
227.
This controversial policy, whereby a no-match letter from SSA or DHS
would be treated as constructive knowledge of unlawful employees, opening employers
up to liability, was passed and then rescinded and has never been implemented. See
Press Release, ACLU, Government Rescinds "No Match" Rule Harmful to
Legal Workers (July 8, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/imnigrants-rights/
government-rescinds-no-match-rule-harmful-legal-workers.
228.
Kaplan, supra note 85, at 557.
229.
Manns, supra note 13, at 971.
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against "foreign-looking" applicants a safer means of avoiding legal liabilS230

ity.

Unless sanctions for employment discrimination approximate sanctions for hiring unauthorized employees, discrimination will remain a
cost-effective strategy for limiting liability in the context of heightened
employer sanctions enforcement. 3' However, while equalizing the cost of
the competing liabilities might make discrimination a less obvious way to
avoid inmigration sanctions, the inaccuracy of the 1-9 and E-Verify verification mechanisms would leave even well-meaning employers with no
reliable means of simultaneously complying with both civil rights law and
employer sanctions provisions.
The lessons of conflict preemption provide a framework for analyzing these dueling liabilities. While federal employer sanctions cannot be
preempted because they are federal law, the purpose of federal conflict
preemption is still implicated where employer sanctions, as implemented
in the context of fraudulent documents and unreliable databases, open
employers up to an impossibility of compliance with applicable imnmigration and antidiscrimination law, thereby "[standing] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress' 232 with respect to two sets of law. If employer sanctions are increased as indicated by congressional proposals, the inaccuracy of
verification mechanisms on which employers must rely would lead to a
conflict in laws, which preemption doctrine seeks to avoid. Thus, conflict
preemption principles suggest that the delegation of federal authority to
private employers should be invalid. No one benefits from a situation
where the least expensive of the two infractions will be chosen as the
necessary evil in making hiring/firing decisions.

230.
See Pham, supra note 18, at 1159.
231.
Manns, supra note 13, at 971. Manns suggests that compensation levels for intentional discrimination laid out in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provide a useful
benchmark: Firms with fifteen to a hundred employees face a cap of $50,000 per violation, employers of 101 to 200 face a cap of $100,000, employers of 201 to 500 face a cap
of $200,000, and a maximum of $300,000 for employers of over 500 employees. Id. at
971-72. Manns also points out that political constraints may limit the range of sanctions
that can be applied to employer violations. Id. at 890 n.6. While courts have consistently
analyzed discrimination in the immigration context differently than in the domestic context, the Supreme Court did hold that INS agents may not stop people on the basis of
"ethnic appearance alone" when performing searches at locations other than the border.
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886 (1975)). This suggests that perhaps employers and local enforcement agents, both of whom are a form of interior control, should be
held to a higher standard than border inspectors in terms of leniency toward racial/ethnic
profiling.
232.
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2009)
granted sub norn. U.S. Chain(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)), cert.
ber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
While it is clear that employer sanctions are universally considered a
failure in terms of their ability to curb unlawful migration, reform
proposals still advocate ramping up enforcement and increasing sanctions.
This Note argues that increasing employer sanctions is not the
appropriate response. Given employers' lack of training in complex
matters of immigration law, the state of verification systems available to
employers, and the widespread availability of fraudulent documents,
enhanced enforcement can only undermine uniformity of immigration
enforcement and open employers up to dueling liabilities, having a
predictable discriminatory impact on employee populations, particularly
those that "look foreign."
Turning a blind eye to unlawful employment may have become the
norm because there are no economically or politically feasible means by
which to provide effective training and uniform enforcement of immigration law through employers, but some might say the real reason is that
2 33
"informal undocumented migration ...benefits all parties concerned.
Indeed, "[the history of discretionary enforcement reflects tacit agreement among politically powerful groups, including employers who need
foreign workers and the consumers who want to keep down the price of
groceries, hotel rooms, and everything else.' 234 Still, politicians have incentives to appear tough on immigration, regardless of whether policies work
or cause harm to immigrants, in order to reap short-term political gains.235
As a result, amidst calls for heightened enforcement, laws are weakly enforced because "strict immigration law enforcement would drag down the
233.
NILES HANSEN, THE BORDER ECONOMY: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
SOUTHWEST 158 (1981). In the context of Mexican migration, Hansen noted over twenty-five years ago that the "United States gains relatively cheap labor willing to perform
tasks that citizen workers are reluctant to undertake. The available evidence shows that
undocumented Mexican workers do not use social services to any significant extent,
though they do pay numerous taxes .... Mexico exports some of its unemployment and
gains foreign exchange that workers send or bring home as well as some technical skills
when workers return home. The migrants gain higher incomes and, frequently, better
working conditions than in Mexico." Id. at 158-59.
234.
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 177 (2006).
235.
See Kevin Johnson, Law and theBorder: Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193,
262 (2003). The political expediency of visible, high-impact enforcement underlies the
emphasis placed on border enforcement (as opposed to interior enforcement, including
employer sanctions). While border enforcement involves visible fences and security cameras and an equally visible impact on the numbers of people attempting to cross at heavily
protected points, employer sanctions efforts "[impose] visible burdens on business. As a
result, significant interest group pressure quietly helps push Congress toward underfunding these enforcement endeavors .... Proposed revisions in the employers' obligations generate detenined resistance among a highly influential interest group. Border
measures, in contrast, step on almost no influential toes." Martin, supra note 45, at 545.
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U.S. economy, block reunification of families, and otherwise hurt broad
segments of American society. [Thus,] [c]hronic but broadly accepted tolerance of illegal immigration
prevails, even if politics demands an
2 36
occasional show of force!'
Short-term political expediency and the symbolic importance of
get-tough immigration proposals may be the only reason politicians continue to call for the enhancement of employer sanctions, despite clear
downsides. If the symbolic value is important enough, we can all tacitly
acknowledge that fact and continue to look the other way, rather than
sacrifice employers, uniformity of federal law, and civil rights protections
in the name of enhanced interior enforcement of immigration laws.

236.
MOTOMURA, supra note 233, at 178. "[V]hen interviewing members of Congress involved in drafting key IRCA provisions, researchers found that the drafters were
most concerned with establishing the legal principle that employers could not hire undocumented workers, 'regardless of whether it was financially, technically, or politically
possible to enforce it rigorously in the short run.' " Phan, supra note 5, at 802.

